The Communist problem in post-war France. by Louria, Margot
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1955








THE CONMUNIST PROBLEM IN POST-WAR FRANCE 
by 
:t-1ARGOT LOURIA 
(A.B., Barnard College, 1950) 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 





Sec ond Reader Q J~ h~ / 
Profes: ; 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
The Communist Attitude Toward Constitutional Government ••• o • 16 
The Turning Point in Communist Strategy • • • o • o • • • • • • • 27 
The Communist Party and the Social Classes of France. • • • • • • 37 
An Analysis of the Cornrnnn1ist Electorate 
The Communist Party and the French Peasantry 
The Communist Party and the Working Class 
The French Communist Party and the Intellectuals of France 
The Organization and Leadership of the French Communist Party • • 76 
The French Communist Party and the Foreign Relations of France. • 85 
Conclusion. • • • • • • . • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • . • • • • 91 
Appendices 
Electoral Statistics 
Changes in the distribution of Communist votes between the two 
major elect ions as revealed by a map of France 
PREFACE 
In the words of Pierre Bertaux -
"For fifteen years the Communists have pulled to their 
ranks the finest young people of France. France is such an old 
country, so much is rotten in it, and the Communist argument is 
so simple - to make an omelet, they say, you must smash eggs. 
So year after year the generous, the noble, the bold, the brilli-
ant youth of a full generation has been drawn to it and been led 
by it to the final abomination which is conmnmism. For the error 
of original decision in joining the Conummists is so slight and 
the final consequences are so terrible. They, the young men of 
conummism, are the truest victims, and the job is not to persecute 
them but to liberate them."* 
* Theodore White, Fire ,E the Ashes. William Sloan Associates, 1953, 
P• 125. 
INTRODUCTION 
The existence of a powerful and well organized Communist 
Party in France receiving the support of nearly one-fourth of the 
1 
French electorate in a national election is one of the most outstanding 
features of the Fourth Republic. The extent to which the Communist 
Party has been accepted by the French people as representing their in-
terests and opinions is hard to assess during the post-war years. The 
Party has met with varying degrees of success and failure in various 
parts of the country in influencing the population to support its point 
of view either by vote or by active participation in the Party itself. 
However, there has been little consistency with which to gauge with 
accuracy what leads to the rejection or acceptance of the Communist 
Party among different segments of the French population. An explanation 
of the response by the French people to Communist appeals encounters a 
variety of diverse factors revealing that the Communist electorate is 
very heterogeneous. 
At the present time an assessment of Communist power in France 
is becoming increasingly difficult because of the complex background of 
emotions and tensions of the French people which are open to exploita-
tion by Communist propaganda. Communist appeals and slogans have coin-
cided with the war-weariness of the French people and their desire for 
a lasting peace. French hostility to the European Defense Community, 
the wish to see an end to the war in Indo-China coupled with the per-
sonal frustrations and resentments of different classes in France have 
been fully exploited by Communist propaganda. In spite of the ability 
of the Communist Party to take advantage of the French state of mind, 
2 
there has been concrete evidence that Communist power is on the wane in 
France. Facts supporting this contention are the decline in Party 
membership, the poor attendance in the Party's public rallies, the drop 
in circulation of Communist newspapers, and the lack of support among 
the working class for Communist sponsored strikes.1 
Yet, there remains one important area which favors the con-
tinued existence of the Communist Party in France. That is the ability 
of the Communist Party to receive the votes of over five million French 
people in a major election. The Communist Party emerged from the last 
national election held in June 1951 with a greater amount of popular 
votes than any one of its competitors.2 Although the Party lost close 
to 500,000 votes since the preceding election of November 1946, the 
loss is surprisingly small in light of the political events that have 
occurred in the interim period. Neither American economic aid to France 
nor the political isolation of the Party after its expulsion from the 
Ramadier cabinet in May, 1947, and its obvious identification with the 
1. These facts will be fully developed in the context of the thesis. 
2. See Appendix 1 
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policies of the Soviet Union deterred the French citizen from casting 
his vote in favor of Comrmmist candidates. Moreover, a study of the 
geographical distribution of electoral votes for Communist sponsored 
candidates reveals that Conmn.mlst voters are widely distributed through-
out the French nation. Conmn.mist penetration of diverse regions or 
France leads one to conclude that it does not appeal solely to the 
working classes but attracts other groups to support its program and 
to espouse its cause. In no.ne of the electoral districts did the 
Communist Party receive less than 5 per cent of the registered votes 
1 in 1951. The results or a survey made in 1952 on Communist voters 
showed that there is no social category in France without some support 
2 for the Conmn.mist point of view. 
The ability of the Communist Party to maintain a large follow-
ing on election day does not mean that its supporters are members of the 
Communist Party or sympathetic to its aims and principles. It does 
mean, however, that the Communist Party has adapted its program to ful-
fill certain needs of the French people in spite of its overt allegiance 
to a foreign power whose political attitude is alien to French national 
interests. The Communist Party has acquired a peculiarly French color-
ing as it bas been able to furnish symbols and myths which provide hope 
1. Francois Goguel, France Under the Fourth Republic. Cornell 
University Press, 1952, p. 99. 
2. Gordon Wright, "France", European Political S;ystems. Edited by 
Taylor Cole, Alfred Knopf, 1953, p. 659. 
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for a disillusioned people and which conveniently coincide with certain 
French traditions. 
The main objective of my study of the Communist problem in 
post-war France will be devoted to an understanding of the attraction 
for the Communist Party on election day. Two complementary sets of ex-
planations will be developed in order to evaluate the attraction to a 
totalitarian party in democratic France. One jJlvolves an appraisal of 
the internal political scene in post-war France, the after-effects of a 
major war, the special problems inherited by the Fourth Republic and an 
analysis of French political traditions which have made France more 
susceptible to totalitarian parties. The other concerns the organiza-
tion and leadership of the French Communist Party; its appeals to dif-
ferent groups and its exploitation of France's difficulties in the 
international field and at home to suit the Party's own purposes. Both 
the internal structure of the Party and the conditions on which it 
thrives are basic to a realistic portrayal of its function in a modern 
democracy. The dual character of the French Communist Party, which is 
at the service of a foreign power but is, at the same time, fed by 
forces that are authentically French necessitates an understanding of 
its double role. 
MOre specifically, the author intends to discuss the position 
and strategy of the French Communist Party prior to and since the 
Liberation, its attitude toward constitutional government, its political 
platform in respect to different classes, its tendency to stand with 
the Soviet Union on questions of foreign policy, and finally the in-
ternal structure of the Party itself. On the basis of the above 
analysis, conclusions can be drawn as to the strength and weakness of 
the Communist Party in France and the consequences of such trends on 
French political institutimns. 
5 
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THE POSITION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY PRIOR TO AND AT LIBERATION 
At the time of Liberation the French Communist Party was at 
the height of its popularity for the following reasons. The growing 
acceptance and support of the Party was facilitated by its record of 
heroism during the Resistance, by the favorable climate of opinion 
toward the Soviet Union in 1945, and by the desire of Frenchmen every-
where to continue and to encourage the national solidarity and esprit de 
corps of different political groups that functioned as a dedicated unit 
during the Resistance. Another outstanding factor contributing to the 
increase in strength of the Party during this period was its ability to 
convey to the French people that it was a truly nationalistically minded 
party and that its goals and aspirations were identical with all patriot-
ic Frenchmen. For proof of their devotion to the interests of France, 
the Communists pointed to their record of all out activity in the Re-
sistance movement, their condemnation of the Vichy regime from its very 
inception, and their ardent support of French democratic principles.1 
The great increase in Communist popularity is even more sur-
prising in light of their attitude before the outbreak of hostilities 
between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Beginning with the German-
Soviet pact of 1939, the Communists adopted a policy of revolutionary 
defeatism and consistently practiced it until June 1941. Communist 
1. Gordon Wright, The Reshaping of French Democracy. Reynal & 
Hitchcock, 1948, p. 65. 
propaganda urged cordial and friendly relations with the Germans, en-
couraged French soldiers to desert from the army, and in some instances 
suggested sabotage of war production.1 The Party never made a direct 
attack on the German forces of occupation but concentrated its attacks 
instead on the "bourgeois" Petain goverrunent for its collaboration.2 
At the same time, the Party condemned any effort of the Gaullist move-
ment to bring France back into the war on the side of Britain. n 'The 
primary objective which, we Frenchmen liDlSt achieve in our struggle for 
peace is this: We JIDlSt not allow the people of France, our resources 
and our territory to be used in the struggle between Germany and 
England. 1113 
The advent of war between the Soviet Union and Germany in 
June 1941-marked the end of neutralism in the French Communist Party. 
Their pacifist attitude changed to one of active participation on the 
side of the French resisters. The first political reaction of the 
French Communists was a return to the slogan of a popular front.4 The 
Communists infiltrated into the most active group, the Front National, 
7 
and took charge of its operations. It became the coordinating unit for 
1. See Franz Borkenau, "France: The Worst of Traitors," from 
European Communism. Harpers, 1953. 
2. Ibid., P• 312. 
3. 1!2!!!·' P• 314. 
4. ~., P• 316. 
underground activities in the zone of German occupation. Membership in 
the Front National was granted to individuals of all shades of opinions 
from the extreme right to the extreme left but the key positions in the 
organization were held by Communists. 
" , Le Front national prone par les communistes 
veut ~tre le plus large possible et englober tous 
les patriotes fran_gais, de gauche ou droite, quelles 
que soient leur tendance politique, leur condition 
sociale, leur confession ••• On ajoute que parmi 
les participants se trouvaient des libres penseurs, 
des ~rsonalites catholiques bien connues, des membres 
~ , , de l'~glise reformee, des membres du clerge ainsi que 
des communistes. 
Since Communist goals coincided with those of patriotic Frencl:unen, the 
Front National attracted many men and women to its ranks who, either 
unaware of or indifferent to Communist methods and doctrines, wished to 
belong to an organization in which they could tak~ action against the 
Nazi aggressor. Because of the Communist Party's experience in con-
ducting its operations in secrecy, its well trained cadres, and its 
loyal and devoted militants, the Party was able to exert a magnetic 
attraction on many non-Communists who were impressed by the courageous 
s 
attitudes and actions of party members in the Resistance movement. Per-
haps the vigor and self-sacrifice of Communist Party members on behBJ.f 
of France helped the French people to overlook their former attitude of 
the Communist Party. The tightly controlled military wing of the Com-
munist Party, the Francs-Tireurs et Partisans, also played an active 
role in the underground in performing acts of sabotage and espionage. 
1. A. Rossi. Physiologie ~ Parti Communiste Francais. pp. 222-223. 
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Their deeds added to the growing admirati~ for the Communist resisters. 
The FTP furnished a large number to the lllljquis who were trained in 
guerilla warfare. The ranks of the mafquis were constantly replenished 
by the steady stream of French deserters from labor and concentration 
camps who, partly because of their illegal status and partly for per-
sonal. motives, joined the :mtquis. During 1943 and 1944 the malquis 
became sufficiently strong to engage the enemy in actual combat, and 
a1 though their casual ties were . high, they managed to deter enemy troops 
from areas where the allies were establishing a stronghold.1 
The tactics of the Conmnmist Party in encouraging daring acts 
of sabotage at the risk of death or torture conflicted with the wishes 
of allied military authorities who preferred a more limited type of ac-
tion. The latter wished to spare French lives and save trained sabo-
teurs for a time when the military picture would be more favorable for 
2 
such deeds and less suicidal. Since the Germans were in the habit of 
taking hostages in retaliation, the deaths of ID8Ily' innocent men and 
women were not worth the damage that might be incurred by sabotage or in 
the assassination of Gel"DDUl officers. However, the Conmnmists had def-
inite purposes in mind in encouraging such acts. They gave the Party 
1. Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin 12 Malenkoy. Frederick A. Pra.eger, 
1953, P• 221. . 
2. Franz Borkena.u, European Conmnmism, p. 320. 
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material. for propaganda appeals and as a result of their cry for venge-
ance, new people swam.ed into Comnnmist front organizations •1 Further-
more, the main purpose of Communist strategy during this period was to 
increase German troop commitments in western Europe, thus alleviating 
German military pressure oo the Soviet Union. The difference in respect 
to strategy involving sabotage in the Resistance between the Comrmmists 
and De Gaulle's Free French Committee in London remained throughout the 
War. 2 Yet, the French Communists had to manipulate cautiously in con-
ducting their activities as they were under orders to avoid open oon-
1 f'lict with De Gaulle during the Resistance period. 
other important successes in the increase of C~1nist 
strength during Resistance years took place in the trade unions. Under 
German and Vichy rule the trade unions had been ordered to dissolve, but 
fom.er officers of the CGT kept the framework intact. The Conmnmist 
position in regard to the CGT was one of persona non grata as they had 
been expelled from the union in September 1939, when the Communist 
Party was declared illegal. The heroic record of the Communists in a 
diffiau.l t time in France 1 s history, and the rising prestige of the 
Soviet Union created a change of attitude among the leaders of the CGT. 
The Le Perreux agreement of Ml.y 1943 granted the Communists permission 
to rejoin the CGT. 3 The Comnnmists 1 hold on the Resistance movement 
1. Franz Borkenau, European Conmnmism. P• 320. 
2. Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Ma.lenkov. p. 219. 
3. Franz Borkenau, European Communism. P• 326. 
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gave them a golden opportunity to infiltrate into the CGT and it was 
only a matter of time before they had the key positions in the CGT 
under their domination. The CGT emerged from the war strong and united 
under Conmnmist control with union membership totalling some 5t 
million.1 
The desire to unite the Resistance movement with the French 
Committee of National Liberation in Algiers led to the formation of the 
National Council of Resistance (CNR) in occupied France in 1-hy 194.3 
through the personal contact of Jean MOulin, De Gaulle's special envoy. 
The CNR represented six political parties, including the Conmrunist . 
Party; eight Resistance groups, including the Front National; amd the 
two principal trade unions, CGT and CFTC (Confederation Francaise des 
Travailleurs Chretiens). 2 A. month 1a ter 1-bu1in and his military adviser 
were arrested by the Germans. Their arrest resulted in a weakening of 
ties of the infant organization with Algiers and gave the Conmomi sts a 
chance to dominate the CNR. Of the five members of the CNR •s permanent 
.3 ' bureau set up to caiTY on business, three were Communists. In the 
CNR's Committee of Military Action two of the three members were Com-
munists. Gaining political control of the CNR strengthened Comnnmjst 
1. Val R. Lorwin, "The Struggle for Control of the French Trade-Union 
Movement, 1945-1949'', MOdern France, P• 200. 
2. Hugh Seton-Watson, ErQ!!! Lenin !Q Malenkov. P• 221 • 
.3. Ibid., P• 221. 
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hopes of being in a position to achieve total control of France at 
Liberation. The CNR was endowed with broad and general powers with the 
purpose of establishing a plan of action during the period of Liberation. 
II n instituait eD particulier deS eomit~S de libti'ration de villes, de 
villages et d 1entreprises, sous la direction des comites dE(partementaux 
de la liberation, eux-~mes subordonn's au CNR. 111 With such power at 
their command, it might have been expected that, during the confusion of 
Liberation, the Communists would present France with their own well 
schemed plan for her future destiny. If the CNR could impose its views 
on the provisional government emerging by stages in Algiers and could 
provide France with a provisional government of its own under Communist 
sponsorship during the time of Liberation, the goal of the Comnnmist 
Party would become a reality. The Communist position was a powerful 
one. They dominated the Front-National- the strongest and most active 
organization in the Resistance. They controlled their own FTP and fUr-
nished the largest number of militants to the ma.tquis who were scattered 
throughout the country. The CNR, the directing organ for national 
liberation in France, was Communist supervised, at least on the top 
executive level. However, political. and military factors thwarted the 
Communists in their desire for power. The personal popularity of De 
Gaulle and the recognition given him as the legitimate head of the 
Provisional Government of France made opposition to his authority 
1. L'Annee Politigue. Paris, Presse Universitaires d~ France, 
1944--45, P• 8. -
/ 
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unreal.istic. Furthermore, De Gaulle bad formed the framework for post-
liberation government and assigned his own civ:U servants to adminis-
trative posts in liberated France bypassing Coiliillllnist demands to use the 
CNR and its local committees as the basis for post-war governmental 
operations.1 De Gaulle made it quite plain that Resistance forces 
could not expect any political power. After the war the so-called 
"patriotic guards" controlled by the Conmnmist Party stationed in dif'-
- 2 ferent sections of France were ordered to disband by De Gaulle. The 
army was le.t't under the control of old time career officers and although 
some 5, 000 ma.tquis were absorbed into the regular army, it was not long 
before they were retired to the reserve.3 
Another reason for failure of Comnnmist hopes was that the 
conduct of the war and the liberation of France was largely in the hands 
of allied military authorities and their orders had to be obeyed. uThus 
the course of the war in 1944 prevented the French conmnmists from using 
the strength that they had gained through resistance as a means or 
seizing power. The state machinery was rebuilt by De Gaulle's men and 
the forces in French society - very different from Balkan - which op-
posed communism were able to reassert themselves.n4 After 1944 the 
1. Gordon Wright. ~ Reshaping of French Democracy. p. 65. 
2. !Qi4., p. 66. For f'ull report, see L 1Annae ~' 194Lv-45, " 
"L 'Affaire des Gardea Patriotiques". 
3. Gordon Wright, The Reshaping of French Democracy. p. 65. 
4. Hugh Seton-Watson, EI£!!! Lenin to MaJ.enkov. p. 222. 
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Comnnmist appraisal of the political picture in France resulted in a 
shif't of strategy to one of gaining power through using legitimate con-
stitutional. methods. The 11 new look" of the Connnunist Party af'ter 1944 
was that of a great Republican Part;y heir to a long and honorable French 
tradition, intensely chauvinistic and devoted exclusively to French 
nationaJ. interests. The words of Mlurice Thorez, veteran leader of the 
Part;y, ably expressed the new line at the Tenth Part;y Congress in June 
1945.1 
Le Parti des trava.illeurs, le Parti du peuple, 
le Parti de la France, au service exclusif du people 
de France, le Parti, dont la politique clairvoyante, -
non seulement dans les paroles prophetiques, mais 
dans les actes, - s 1est revelee entierement conformB 
aux inte~ts du people de France, une poli tique qui 
s 'est affi~e, au cours des dix demieres annees 
notamment, comme la seule politique francaise. 
J 
The change in Comnnmist polic;r from a clandestine underground 
Part;y to an acceptable and legal contender for political power was not 
a difficult one because the politicaJ. climate of opinion that prevailed 
in 1945 was heavily weighted toward a more liberal and progressive pro-
gram in post-war government. The tremendous prestige of the Soviet 
Union at the end of the war made people overlook the despotic and ruth-
less nature of its governing elite. The Frenchman's lack of confidence 
in the bourgeois class because of its stand with Vichy, his disgust at 
the failure of the Third Republic, and the widespread desire for basic 
1. M:l.urice Thorez, ~ Politiaue de Gra.ndeur Fra.ncaise. Editions 
Socials Paris, 1945, P• 370. 
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social change contributed to the acceptance of the Communist Party as an 
authentic French political party.1 The dissolution of the Comintern in 
1943 eliminated an overt allegiance to Moscow which would have put the 
present Party strategy in an embarrassing position. A spirit of op-
timism and a reaffirmation in France's potentialities as a great power 
prevailed for a brief time after Liberation and an earnest desire to re-
build France forged new unity among the parties. Unfortunately the unity wo..S 
shortlived as the qualities which resulted in a well organized and suc-
cessful underground movement were vastly different from those required 
to run the country in peace time. 
On the eve of the Fourth Republic the French Comrmm1st Party 
stood to profit by the prevailing feelings and attitudes of the French 
people. The Party, itself, stood strong and proud, its ranks united in 
a commonfaith, its leaders confident of new successes and eventual 
triumph. Leadership, discipline, tight organization and an all-inclusive 
philosophy molded the Party into a dynamic force destined to be a power-
tu1 influence on the French political scene in the post-war period. 
"Its new strength and prestige made it a necessary ally in any coaJ..ition 
government and led many to believe in its inevitable triumph. Few 
people had the courage to criticize it openly. 112 
1. Charles A. Mi.caud, "Organization and Leadership of the French 
Communist Party." ~ Polities, April 1952, p. 321. 
2. ~., P• 318. 
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THE COMMUNIST ATTITUDE TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 
The entrance of the French Communist Party into discussions 
C).. 
on the nature of/post~r constitution early in 1944 came as a surprise 
to resistance circles. Before 1944 the Communist Party bad never 
shown any interest in the structure of capitalist government except in 
a negative way. Their usual view point, expressed by Thorez to the 
Party's Central Connnittee in 1934, was that " 1We are engaged in the 
struggle for power. For all power to the Soviets. For destruction of 
the bourgeoisie state and its replacement by the state of workers and 
peasants. '"l The long-range goal of the Communist Party was fairly 
obvious, that of establishing a Soviet type republic in France, but 
their concept during the interim period had never been clear. No wonder 
the announcement of their views created a mild sensation and led some to 
believe that the Party had pennanently discarded its ultimate aim for 
a more realistic one. The new line was set down in a clandestine issue 
of Cahiers du Communisme, a revived Connnunist Party periodical, published 
in 1944.2 The ideas which were expounded in the article were consist-
ently adhered to by all Party members. From 1944 on, the Conmnmi st 
position in regard to their formula for the new constitution was 
1. Gordon Wright, The Reshaping 2£ French Democracy. p. 19. 
2. Ibid., P• 38. 
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relatively fixed and -~ears out that once a top-level decision has been 
made in regard to party policy, there is little deviation from it ex-
cept under unusual circumstances. An analysis of the Communists ' 
attitude toward a constitution for France reveals at one and the same 
time their hope to fulfill the republican tradition in French politics 
and to adopt a point of view which offered them the max:iim:un chance to 
obtain power through legal means. 
The Communists were adamant about several principles from 
which they did not deviate. First and foremost, they desired a con-
stitution which placed almost complete power in the hands of a single 
chamber, the National Assembly. The fault of the Third Republic, they 
felt, had not been a weak executive, but a weak legislati~ body which 
had lost all sense of responsibility and had abandoned their powers to 
certain extra-parliamentary procedures. Men like Dal.adier were allOW'ed 
to run the country by decree-laws over a period of years, without in-
sisting that the ministers keep the Chamber informed as to their activi-
ties. Thorez aired his feelings on this subject to a party committee 
and said the following? 
· N 1est-ce pas un fait que le Parlement, avant / 
de s 1aplatir devant Petain et Laval, s'etait laisse 
deposs6der, bien avant la guerre, de see pr$rogatives 
de legislation et de oonttale1 N1est-ce pas un fait 
que la pratique des deerets-lois etait devenue la 
regle? Et quand on parle de la faiblesse p~tendue 
1. George Cogniot, 11La Tradition Republicaine et les Bases d 1une ./ 
Constitution Democratique. 11 CaJ.rlers du Communisme, Fevrier 1945, 
PP• 65-66. 
de 1 'Extcutif et de 1 'instabilitt ministtz.ielle, 
il nous est bie~ permis de f'aire observer que tel 
portef'euille, decisif' quanta !'organisation de la 
Defense Na tionaJ.e, fut de'tenu presque constamment 
par, une me'lne personne, au cours des hui t annees qui 
, / ' / precederent notre desa_tre milita.ire de 1940. 
lS 
. The ~mmunist adoption of' government by assembly as the proper 
goal without the necessary counterbalancing elements which provide the 
best guarantees against a majority becoming dictatorial is a reflection 
of' their own well advised scheme to take over when the time was favor-
able. The only solution that the Communists offered to provide a check 
against the possibility of' a tyrannical majority was the permanent right 
of' the voters to revoke their deputy. The threat of recall would force 
the deputies to carry out the wishes of their electors and would make 
political parties form clear and responsible programs. The Communists 
envisaged democracy as representing the will of the majority vesting its 
pCMer in a one-house assembly. That assembly would control the cabinet 
d the deputies in turn would be controlled by the electors, who could 
ecall them if' they should neglect their duties or violate a campaign 
romise. The Communist stand was now explicit and unlikely to change. 
he happy coincidence of' falling squarely in line with the popular 
qualitarian-democratic philosophy of Robespierre and Rousseau added 
r idity and justification to the Coiiiillllllist conception of' democratic 
government. It remained until after Liberation for basic issues among 
jrench political parties to be resolved. The Communist proposal of' government by assembly as an effec-
tive means to prevent governmental instability and irresponsibility ran 
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counter to the plans of certain resistance groups who desired a stronger 
central authority and were attracted toward a form of presidential. 
government. The Communist position was so diametrically in opposition 
to the prevailing trends in resistance circles that months of discussion 
would be required to find a connnon basis of agreement. Their stand 
wrecked the early unanimity on the fUndamentals of a constitution which 
resistance leaders wished to present to the public at Liberation. 
Furthermore, the Comnumist espousal of the suprenacy of parliament 
identified them with the republican tradition while those favoring a 
strong executive found themselves in the embarrassing position of up-
holding the right wing and monarchist tradition. 
In order to prevent any possibility of a strong executive be-
coming a reality, the Communists insisted that a constituent assembly 
be elected as soon arter Liberation as possible. "'The re-establish-
mem.t of democracy, '" they proclaimed, " 'must be achieved by democracy 
. . 1 
itself, not by technocratic brotherhoods or aristocratic areopagi • . ttt 
The Communists opposed any plan which provided for a lengthy period or 
provisiQnal government and were suspicious that such a delay was aimed 
at implanting an American-type presidential system with De Gaulle at the 
head. 
The constitutional problem was put aside until the late spring 
of 1945, nine months after Paris was liberated when . it was decided that 
an election ought to be held before the end of the year. Two choices 
1. Gordon Wright, The Reshaping of French Democracy. p. 3S. 
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were offered the voter; either a return to the 1875 constitution or a 
constituent assembly with its powers and duration specifically limited 
in advance.1 The latter alternative would restrict the assembly's 
tem to seven months and would deny it the right to overthrow the 
cabinet or president during that period. 
The result of the referendum was in favor of a constituent 
assembly of seven months term, at the end of which on the basis of a 
referendum, the decisions of the constituent assembly would either be 
approved or rejected. The newly-elected assembly was most heavily 
weighted toward the left than any elected body in French history with the 
Communists polling 26 per cent of the vote, the Socialists 25 per cent 
and the recently formed MRP 24 per cent.2 The Communists were most 
anxious to receive the support of the Socialists as together they had a 
slight majority in the Assembly with which they could impose their 
ideas with a reasonable chance of success. In December 1944, a per-
manent comite d 'entente was set up to explore the possibility of in-
creased cooperation with the hope of eventual unity and mergence of the 
two parties. 2 Of all the parties the Communists were the best prepared 
as to their concept of the fundamentals of the new constitution. They 
possessed a complete constitutional text ready for presentation to the 
new assembly. 
1. Gordon Wright, ~Reshaping of French Democracy. p. 82. 
2. Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to· Mal.enkov. pp. 291-292. 
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On two basic issues all three parties were in mutual agreement. 
All three felt that France needed a new constitution from the start 
rather than a revision of the old one. From here on in agreement ended 
1 
and divergency began. The most important areat of difference among 
the parties was how much power and independence should be given the 
executive. On this point the Communists held to their former views and 
opposed any mechanism which would force the assembly to share its power. 
The Communists' executive would be elected by the legislature but possess 
no political power such as the right to dissolve the assembly.2 Their 
executive would be a mere figurehead to preside over formal functions 
as chief of state and would only keep the single privilege of naming 
the premier.J 
Communist strategy during the period of the first Constituent 
Assembly was to win over the left wing parties to share their point of 
view and to force De Gaulle and his supporters to acquiesce to Communist 
principles. The Communist Party's relationship to De Gaulle had been 
one of indirect opposition. The Party had never regarded De Gaulle with 
any enthusiasm but had refrained from criticizing him personally. During 
the campaign of the first referendum the Communists had fought De Gaulle's 
ideas vigorously, but had maintained his figurehead above the controversy. 
1. Op. Cit., p. S5. 
2. ~., P• S6 • 
.3. ~., P• ~. 
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No doubt the personal prestige of De Gaulle was so great at this time 
that opposition to him would incur the anger of the French people. , 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Communists considered De Gaulle 
a major obstacle to the fulfillment of their plans in France. It was 
around his influence that an anti-Communist bloc might be formed. Be-
cause of his popularity in France, the Communists did not oppose his 
renomination as President of the Provisional Government, a post which he 
had held since Liberation. However, any accord that existed between 
De Gaulle and the French Communist Party broke down completely when 
De Gaulle rejected Communist demands for one of the three ministries in 
his cabinet, Foreign Affairs, Interior or National Defense.1 De Gaulle 
made it plain that he considered the French Communist Party as an agent 
of a foreign power and therefore not qualified to hold such responsible 
positions. In a stormy session with Thorez, De Gaulle caused additiorial 
wrath by reminding Thorez that if it had not been for his personal inter-
vention Thorez would now be in jail for military desertion in 1940.2 
The crisis was resolved by a plan to split the National Defense ministry 
inwt wo sections, one of which was handed over to a Communist.3 The 
bitter resentment that the Communist Party had been nourishing against 
De Gaulle was now in the open. Their hopes of evicting De Gaulle from 
1. Cahiers Du Comnnmisme, Fevrier, 1945, p. 110. 
2. ~., p. 110. 
3. ~., p. 111. 
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the political scene were realized when he handed in his resignation on 
January 20, 1946. 
The draft of the first. Constituent Assembly approved by a 
Communist and Socialist majority of 309 against the center rightist 
parties 1 minority of 249 represented a victory for Communist ... sponsored 
principles. The essential point of the first draft was the supremacy 
of the National Assembly supplemented by wo consultative bodies. How-
ever, the draft was rejected in the May 5 referendum by a close majority 
of 53 per cent of the electorate or nearly a million votes.l Its rejec-
tion was caused by fear that the unicameral assembly might serve the 
purpose of a totalitarian party and would leave no constitutional 
barrier against the possible tyranny of a single majority if it should 
sweep the country in a general election. Few people stopped to consider 
that if the Communist Party or any party of a dictatorial nature should 
win a clear majority constitutional checks and~ances would be of 
little avail. The French voter was beset with 'tA::> conflicting problems, 
both of which reveal a fear of authority in government. One was how to 
prevent the assembly from becoming too powerful. The other was how to 
prevent the executice from becoming too strong. A solution of the con-
flict could only be resolved at the sacrifice of speed and efficiency in 
government, a price which the French have so far been willing to pay. 
The Communists made a strategic error in the midst of their 
intense propaganda campaign on behalf of the draft which might have cost 
1. See Appendix 1. 
them the victory they had hoped for. They raised their favorite battle 
cry, "Thorez au Pouvoir". The effect of such a thought becoming a 
reality created panic among non-Communists, especially the Socialists 
who, after committing themselves to support Communist-sponsored prin-
ciples in the Assembly, were now inclined to reject the draft. The 
referendum became in the minds of many citizens a plebiscite for or 
against the Communist Party •1 Almost from the beginning, the MRP and 
other center or rightist parties directed their attacks against the 
Communist Party, rather than against the draft constitution. The deci-
sion of the French public to reject the draft represented a serious de-
feat for the Communists. In the opinion of the eminent political 
scientist, Fran~ois Goguel, the rejection of the draft marks the decline 
2 -
of Communist influence on French political life. Until this time many 
people had believed in the inevitable triumph of the Party and lent 
their support because they wished to favor a party which was likely to 
succeed. The legend of Communist infallibility was now unquestionably 
destroyed and Frenchmen were able to appraise the Party in a more 
realistic light. 
The second Constituent Assembly gave the MRP 28 per cent, the 
Communist Party 26 per cent, and the Socialist Party 21 per cent. The 
1. Foundation for Foreign Affairs, A Constitution for the Fourth 
Republic, 1947, p. 53. 
2. Francois Goguel, France Under~ Fourth Republic. Cornell 
University Press, 1952, p. 11. 
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ability of the Conmnmist Party to obtain 26 per cent of the voting elec-
torate was a result of clever strategy during pre-electioneering. The 
Communists interpreted the defeat of the first draft constitution as a 
victory of the reactionary forces and advanced the argument that all 
democratic forces must rally together to meet the impending attack.l 
The reversal of tactics enabled the Communists to emerge from the polls 
unscathed with 140,000 new votes to their credit. 
Oomnnmist strategy during the second Constituent Assembly was 
to fight any changes from the first draft and to prevent the consolida-
tion of a left-center bloc. They were defeated on both counts but not 
seriously. The Assembly produced a draft which represented a compromise 
between the claims of the Communists and of the MRP. No doubt all three 
major parties were brought together in their common fear of De Gaulle, 
who wished the President of the Republic to have greater powers than a:n:y 
of the three governmental parties were prepared to grant. His views1 
which were outlined at a patriotic ceremony at Bayeux1 brought quick re-
action from Conmnmist quarters. The Communists acaused De Gaulle of 
proposing a presidential semi-dictatorship and of attempting with 
Machiavellian innocence to prepare his own return to power. 2 
The constitution as it emerged from a series of party eo~ 
promises did not differ radieally from its predecessor which had been 
1. Op. Cit., P• 55. 
2. Gordon Wright, ~Reshaping of French Democracy. p. 196. 
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rejected at the polls. The draft added an upper house of parliament 
with advisory powers and made other changes, but the original draft of' 
the first Constituent Assembly remined intact. The slight modifications 
that distinguished the second draft from the first did not warrant the 
abuse heaped upon it by the Comnnmist Party, but protest after protest 
followed anyway. In the end, the Comnnmists came around to support it, 
but with less enthusiasm remembering their costly error in the last cam-
paign. 
The second referendum, in October 1946, was essentially a 
political struggle between the three major parties on the one hand and 
De Gaulle on the other.1 The constitution was ratified on October 13, 
1946, but only because there were many abstentions.2 It received over 
91 0001000 in favor of it, 7,790,856 against it with 7,775,893 abstentions. 
The dominant atmosphere by the end of 1946 was one of pessimism, cynicism 
and frustration, scarcely a hopefUl sign for the success of' the new 
constitution. At least the French republic possessed a framework within 
whieh political institutions could operate - that in itself' is a notable 
achievement in a country which is so deeply split on political issues. 
1. Gordon Wright, nFrancett, European Political Systems. p. 615. 
2. See Appendix 1. 
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THE TURNING POINT IN COMMUNIST STRATEGY 
The results of the first election to the National Assembly 
under the new constitution divided the three major parties in the follow-
ing way. The Comnnmists won 28.6 per cent of the electorate while that 
of the MRP fell to 26.4 per cent and the Socialists, 17.9 per cent, with 
the consequence that the smooth .t'unationing of the government would de-
pend on the continuance of tripartism.1 The Communis~~ing the largest 
single Party in the Assembly demanded the premiership and placed the name 
of Ma.uriee Thorez as its candidate. This was refused by the majority o£ 
the Assembly and Leon Blum, veteran leader of the Socialist Party, was 
elected instead. The hardening of party lines made it diffiaul t for 
Blum to form a coalition government and forced him to rely on an ex-
elusively Socialist ministry although the Socialist Party was a small 
minority in the National Assembly. Despite the many obstacles, Blum's 
short time in office tumed out to be one of the most eonstrueti ve and 
successful ministries in the post-war period. 11For the first time in 
months the Cabinet functioned as a harmonious team, proposed a set of 
vigorous and consistent measures designed to solve the country's prob-
lams, explained its aims to the people and called for their cooperation. 
Its program of economic stabilization through freezing wages and reduc-
ing prices met general skepticism at first. But to the general amazement 
1. See Appendix 1. 
of the country, Blum's call for an immediate five per cent price out 
1 
actually brought results. 11 
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Tripartism took on temporary strength when, after Leon Blum's 
resignation in January, a cabinet was formed by Ramadier with the coopera-
tion of the Communists and MRP. The Communists held the following posts 
in Ramadier 1s cabinet, National Defense, Reconstruction, and Work and 
Social Security.2 Ramadier 1s efforts to carry on Blum's eeonomie policies 
and to provide France with some semblance of unity was made impossible by 
two major problems, French colonial. policy and wage and price control. 
The Communist Party was the chief dissenter from the opinions held by the 
majority of parties in the Assembly on how to deal with these two issues. 
The most violent disagreement was over the outbreak of war in Indo-China 
in December 1946. All parties except the Communists believed that the 
French Empire was in grave danger. The Communists in opposition to 
governmental policy almost broke up the Ramadier cabinet when they re-
fused to vote special credits for the Indo-Chinese campaign early in 
March. 3 The Communist solution to the Indo-China war was to stop hostil-
ities at onee and to accept HO Chi Minh 1s terms. It was the first time 
that the Communists had run counter to public sentiment. Their stand was 
1. Gordon Wright, ~ Reshaping .2! French Democracy. p. 248. 
2. L 1Annee Politigue, 1947, p. 4. 
3. Ibid., P• 39. 
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an unpopular ·one and they knew it but loyalty to Leninist-Stalinist 
principles remained their first consideration. 
The question of wage and price stabilization placed the Com-
munist Party in another dilemma. They gave lukewarm support to the 
government's plan to cut inflation by freezing wages and prices, but 
continued to foster discontent among the working classes for a higher 
wage scale. Even before the national elections of November 1946, the 
Communist-dominated labor union, CGT, demanded an increase of 25 per cent 
in all controlled wages to compensate for high prices of food and other 
essentials.1 Their conflicting attitude led one to reflect on the 
Party's motivation. An increase in wages could not better the working 
man's status without setting in motion a vicious inflationary spiral. 
The motive of the Communist Party was a defensive one - to head off 
rising discontent among their chief supporters, the working classes, 
and to abstain from partioipa ting in the government at a time when the 
sensitive issue of wages and prices overshad~ed all others. 
The dual role of the Communist Party in :o:asquerading as a 
government party and in preaching the gospel of revolution aroused the 
suspicions or other political parties as to the ultimate intentions or 
Ci'onmnmist strategy. The Socialist Party, which bad affiliated itself 
with the policies of the Communists more than any other major political 
party, was discovering that Communist participation in the government 
1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, "The New French 
Constituent Assembly. 11 World Today, July 1946, p. 303. 
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did not prevent them from being a party in opposition. According to one 
1 
correspondent, 
Since the liberation whilst maintaining its 
Ministers in the Government, it has been the most 
active party of the Opposition, as is borne out by 
the Communist eampaigm on the referendum ••• This 
doubling of functions cannot last: either the Com-
munist Party will have to forego soma of the port-
folios to which its numerical strength legitimately 
entitles it, or it will have to behave as a govern-
mental party, with the restrictions on propaganda 
which that position normally entails. 
The Communist Party accepted neither of these alternatives and 
continued to play a double game DDlCh to the growing irritation of Social-
ist colleagues as well as other governmental officials. At the Socialist 
Congress of 1946, M. Andre Philip declared that, after five months • ex-
perience, he felt that it was extremely difficult to work with the Com-
munists because they did not display "the essential minimum of intellec-
tual honestt'. 2 
In governmental discussions (he said) their posi-
tion is determined exclusively by electoral calculations. 
They put forward demagogic proposals with the sole pur-
pose of seeing them defeated by their colleagues; they 
are sabotaging and compromising, perhaps irremediably 
the very idea of na tionaJ.iza tion • • • by using national-
ized industries in order to achieve their party's domina-
tion of the very structure of the State. 
The position occupied b.1 the Socialist Party in post-war 
coalition governments was a difficult one. Their attempts to solicit 
working class support was made ineffective by Communist propaganda which 
1. tes Cahiers Politigues, November 1945, p. ll. 
2. Reported in~ PopuJ.aire, Septem}:)er 2, 1946. 
.31 
was always able to go one better in supporting a measure likely to be 
popular with the electorate. 11 ••• the Socialists were sometimes led 
by their fear of the electoral success of Communist tactics to copy 
their methods, only to see the ground swept from under their feet by a 
party whose ability to maneuver and to make repeated volte-face was 
obviously superior to that of a party democratically organized. tt1 The 
Socialist position was difficult because the Communist pose of defender 
of working class interests was both attractive and hard to discredit. 
The average worker could not be expected to understand how and where 
Communist propaganda was dishonest. All he saw was that on issues con-
-oerning his welfare the Communists were on his side. 
It was on the issue of higher wages for the working class that 
the parting of the ways between the Communist Party and the French 
government finally came. The precipitating factor which influenced Com-
munist strategy was the outbreak of strikes at the Renault factory 
launched passibly by a group of Trotskyites.2 The Communist Party con-
demned the strike at first, but a week later gave the strikers its full 
support in their demand for higher wages. The Communist decision to 
oppose the gover.nmentrs wage stabilization policy had momentous conse-
quences not only for the Party's future, but for the French nation as a 
whole. It was a national crisis because it affected the freezing of 
1. Dorothy Pickles, French Polities. Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 195.3, p. 24. 
2. Franz Borkenau, European Communism. p. 477. 
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prices on which the whole economic policy of the gover.nment was based and 
because the Renault plant was a nationalized factory. M. Ramadier put 
the question of confidence and this time Comnnmist ministers and deputies 
1 
voted against him en bloc. Ramadier invited them to resign. They re-
fused, whereupon Ra.madier fired them from their jobs, an action which 
took courage on his part. 
The dismissal of the Communists from the Ramadier government 
was made more dramatic since action against the Comnnmists was taken by 
the Socialists who had been willing to collaborate with the Communist 
Party on several issues. In taking their decision the Socialists were 
assuming risks. However justifiably, they were moving against the 
numerically largest party in France which controlled the key posts in 
the GOT and other unions. They were resisting real grievances on the 
part of wage owners whose pay was low during a time of high prices and 
who probably do not fully accept the Socialist belief that wages must be 
frozen to avoid inflation. 
The reasoning of French Communist leaders which lead to their 
support of a relatively unimportant strike and their inevitable ejection 
from the cabinet is significant to understand in view of the Communist 
goal, that of seizing power. Remaining in the government had its advan-
tages. MOst important, the Communists had access to governmental in-
formation and intimate knowledge of its deliberations and decisions in 
the field of domestic and international affairs. They were able to 
1. L'Annee Politigue, 1947, P• 9lf. 
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ascertain with ease the strategy of the government in the impending East-
West conflict and on the basis of inside information act swiftly and ef-
.recti vely. Furthermore, holding various ministerial posts gave the Com-
munists the opportunity of giving faithfUl party members jobs. Never had 
a party made such good use of the S'poils System as the Communis't6 did, and 
dozens of Communists utilized their government jobs for propaganda and 
agitation. 
In this matter we can only venture a guess since the official. 
policy of the French Communist Party whether emanating from Moscow or 
Paris is not known to us. The objective of the Communist Party is the 
seizure of the ruling power of a country. Strategy is planned toward 
achieving this goal. With much finesse the Communist Party practiced 
successively three methods.1 The first one carried out until December 
1944 consisted in infiltrating the various Resistance organizations and 
using these groups as their springboard to power in the confusion of 
Liberation. During the spring of 1943, Communist strength was consoli-
dated in the CNR which the party bad expected t0 use as the basis of the 
provisional government in post-vrar France. 11 'The National Gotmcil of' 
Resistance (CNR) would take the place of the government; the Departmental. 
Committees of Liberation would impose their will on the prefects; in each 
district the former Francs Tireurs Partisans (FTPC), having kept their 
1. J. B. Duroselle, uThe Turning Point in French Polities: 1947. 11 
Ib2 Review of Politics, July 1951. 
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arms and having remained in place, would have sufficient strength to 
constitute on all pOl.lerful police force • • • While the Maquis non-
Co:rmmmists were frequently joining up with the Allied Armies, the FTPF 
were establishing themselves under the guise of 'civic' or 'patriotic 
guards. 1111 An awareness of what might happen if these "patriotic guards" 
should become too numerous led to the elimination of them by De Gaulle 
and his government. The dissolution of the guards reduced the CNR to an 
impotent force with purely consultative powers. Method number one had 
its temporary success but owing to De Gaulle 1s attitude toward the Com-
munist Party, measures were taken to put a stop to further expansion by 
the Communists, and prevented them from achieving their aims.2 
Method number ttlG adopted in 1944 involved political coopera-
tion with the post-war government. Later it developed into a super-
patriotic attitude exalting French democratic principles and proclaiming 
a desire to contribute to French economic recovery. The Communist pro-
gram ca.ll.ed for greater political and financial autonomy in the conn:nunes 
and departments. They wished to nationalize heavy industries, to in-
crease taxation of higher incomes and to abolish trusts.3 Their platform 
was based largely on a collection of explicit demands and vague terms 
rather than an explanation of the methods necessary to carry out 
1. Ibid., P• 309. 
2. See PP• 12-13 of thesis. 
3. Le Monde, April 28, 1945, p. 2. 
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reconstruction and modernization of industry, and the sacrifices which 
would be involved. 
From the begillning the Connnunists had found it difficult to 
participate in governments which they could not control. Their tradition-
al attitude toward parliaments had been that the National Assembly pr~ 
vided an excellent opportunity for the exposition of their own views, 
which was a more enjoyable task for Conmnmist deputies than assuming any 
responsibility for them. The various setbacks that the Comnnmist Party 
received in the refusal of the MRP and right-wing parties to allow it to 
become too powerful in the National issembly, forced the party to re-
evaluate its equivocal stand. Party leaders became aware that assuming 
power by taking full control of the National Assembly was becoming less 
likely when Thorez was rejected for the presidency of the National 
.A.ssembly. 
From May 1947 on, the third method was practiced as the most 
feasible alternative - direct opposition to the government by fomenting 
strikes and by a barrage of propaganda damning governmental policies. 
To use this means it became necessar,r to leave the government entirely. 
Other elements helped to make this decision. The intensification of the 
Cold War forced the Conmrunists to take sides and to abandon its policy of 
collaboration with other parties. France's acceptance of Marshall Plan 
aid would have made the Conmnmists become pro-.American which they could 
not have tolerated for long without causing havoc in Moscow. The war in 
Indo-China could not have been supported by the Communist Party without 
drastic change in their fundamental tenets and loss of Moscow support. 
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Furthermore, loyalty to the cause of the working class and fear of bemg 
outmaneuvered by the left flank gave them little choice. There is some 
reason to believe that Thorez simply faced working class demands for 
higher pay which he could not oppose without risking Communist leadership 
in the trade unions. The Communist Party was also aware that, as a party 
in opposition, it would be able to exercise far more influence than its 
numbers warranted because the RAdicals, MRP, and Socialists would never 
be able to meet the Communist challenge effectively as a team. The next 
years revealed that the Communists were correct in this assumption, as 
the parties in the government were not agreed on economic issues any 
more than on a unified political philosophy. The success of the new 
Comnnmist line depended, in the last analysis, on the support of dif-
ferent social classes in France. With this in mind appeals made by the 
French Communist Party to various groups in French Society will be 
analyzed. 
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THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE SOCIAL CLASSES OF FRANCE 
An Analysis of the Communist Electorate 
The ability of the Communist Party to maintain its influence 
over those who were previously inclined to vote the Comnnmist ticket and 
to win new supporters after 194 7 met with success in parts of France and 
failure in other sections of the country.1 In general, the Communist 
Party was able to rally five million votes at a national election re-
gardless of its attitude of obstruction and hostility to the French 
Government. A comparison of the Communist vote of 1951 with that of 
1946 reveals that the political events which took place in the interim 
period did not change the strength of the Communist vote or geographical 
2 
distribution of Communist sympathizers to any considerable degree. 
The greatest concentration of votes for the Communist Party 
is found in the industrial region between Paris and the Belgian border 
including the departments of Ardennes, Mime, and Aube in the east and 
Some and Sein-Inferiere in the west. 2 In certain districts of that area 
votes for the qommunist Party increased in the 1951 elections reflecting 
the continued popularity of the Party's platform among industrial workers 
and .their families. Thus, the Communist Party has been able to retain 
1. See Appendix 2 for changes in the geographical distribution in 
Communist votes between November 10, 1946 and June 17, 1951. 
2. See the studies by Francois Gogue1, nGeographie des elections du 
17 juin 1951~, Esprit, Vol. 19, PP• 343-364. (Sept. 1951) 
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its strang hold on the eligible voters in northern France which is noted 
for its large industrial working class. In other districts notably 
Paris and its suburbs the Communist vote was not as great as it had been 
in previous na tiona! elections. The peak of Comnnmist voting strength 
in Paris was as high as 38 per cent ill 1936, but it has never reached 
this height since, suggesting that Communist appeal is on the decline and 
will not be able to recapture its former popular! ty among Parisians. One 
explanation for the loss of Communist votes in Paris in the last election 
lies in the activities of the RPF, De Gaulle 1s Party, and the esteem with 
which it was regarded by Parisian voters. The inability of the Communist 
Party to obtain all the votes of industrial regions leads one to conclude 
that the electoral strength of the Party is not always proportional to 
the degree of industrialization and urban conce~tration. The Conmrunist 
Party has been able to capture most of the workers 1 votes, but it is far 
from receiving them all and may not even be able to win half. 
The Communist Party achieved its greatest success in the 1951 
elections in the rural and semi-rural areas of France where agriculture 
and small-scale industry predominate. The two outstanding rural sections 
which have supported the Communist Party in their vote are located in 
1 
central and southeastern France. The first of these Communist strong-
holds is fmmd in the central plateau of France (Massif Central) extend-
ing in a northerly and southerly direction including the departments of 
1. Henry Ehrllmm, "The French Peasant and Communism", ~American 
Political Science Review, March 1952. 
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Berry, Bourbonnais, Limousin, and Perigord. Throughout this region the 
Communist Party is by far the strongest of all French political parties. 
The percentage of Communist votes amounts to 30 and 35 per c ent of the 
registered voters in some of these departments and falls nowhere below 
1 20 per cent. In eight constituencies in this area the Communist Party 
gained new supporters in the last election increasing its vote by 15 per 
cent, while the nationwide loss of Communist votes reached almost 10 per 
cent. The other rural concentration of Communist voters is found in the 
Mediterranean littoral including the departments of Lozere, Ardeche, and 
Drome. In most of these electoral districts the Communist Party obtained 
beween 25 and 30 per cent of the registered vote in the last election 
and in a number of constituencies the Communists gained additional votes, 
though not as many as in the Massif Central. 
The response of rural France to Communist propaganda is best 
understood in terms of its past voting habits, that of supporting the 
party that is furthest to the left. Professor Goguel pointed out this 
tendency by comparing the electoral map of 1S48 with that of 1946 which 
revealed that the very same areas which now vote in favor of the Communist 
2 Party voted in 1S48 for the radical Montagards. The Mediterranean south 
and the M:l.ssif Central are now areas of Communist strength as a result of 
the well-entrenched historical pattern of favoring the party most 
1. Ibid., P• 20. 
2. Francois Gogu.el, France Under the Fourth Republic, P• 95. 
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vociferous in its opposition to the government. · The acceptance of left-
wing parties among the French peasantry dates back to the days of 
Richelieu and the creation of a centralized and powerfUl state. The 
fear of governmental interference fostered the growth of parties which 
would oppose its authority. It would seem that the purpose of these in-
dividualistic and conservative French peasants in voting for the Communist 
Party is to weaken the state and to prevent it from interfering in their 
affairs and not out of a desire to see the Communists in power. The true 
nature of the Communist Party, which is largely dominated by a foreign 
power, is not sufficiently understood by the average French farmer for 
him to reject the Party or to be more articulate in his voting habits. 
The najor losses in votes for the COliiDD.lilist Party in rural 
France in the 1951 elections are unequally distributed although there bas 
been a noticeable decline in the northwest of France and in the east close 
to the Swiss border. The Party's decline was most severe in those areas 
which it had only recently penetrated and where it was not firmly rooted. 
The earlier successes of the Party in these areas was due to the favorable 
climate of opinion created by the Communist record in the Resistance but 
Communist post-war popularity was shortlived because of their attitude 
since 1947. Goguel made the following comment about c·ommunist losses in 
the 1951 elections.1 
1. Francois Goguel, "Geographie des Elections du 17 jUin 1951", 
Esprit, Sept. 1951, p. 352. 
Les zones de recul important sont presque toutes 
situees dans des regions de temperament politique 
traditionnellement conservateur modere ou radical: 
••• I1 s'agit lade regions ou le communisme avait 
penEttre apres la Liberation, a la faveur de la propa-
ganda Vichyssoise qui lui avait constamment identifie 
la Resistance, et en qualitt de parti patriote, 
gouvernemental, et indemne' de toute attache etrangere. 
Son recul actual parait provenire essentiellement de 
la tactique revolutionnaire et par trop lie'e aux/ 
positions de la Russia sovietique qu 1il a adoptee 
depuis 1947. 
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A geographical and social analysis of Communist voters seems 
to demonstrate that the factors explaining the strength of communism in 
France are very diverse and that its electorate is heterogeneous. Two 
points should be kept in mind in understanding French communism before 
studying Communist appeals directed at the French worker and farmer. One, 
the Communist Party attracts rural as well as urban workers. Two, there 
is much greater difference between the Communist voter and the militant 
Communist than one might expect. Not only are four-fifths of the Com-
lllllD.ist voters not Party members, but they vote Comrmmist for reasons 
which often have little to do with the special nature and aims of the 
French Communist Party. 
The Communist Party and the French Peasantry 
Communist success in winning the vote of rural French farmers 
is a comparatively recent development dating back to 1944, although the 
foundations for peasant support of the Party were laid as early as 1920.1 
1. Gordon Wright, 11Co:mnn.mists and Peasantry in France", Modern France, 
P• 221. 
The recent acceptance of communism by the peasants in isolated rural 
areas was greatly facilitated by the contacts made with Comnnmists in 
the Resistance as well as technical progress in communications. However, 
no single or simple answer is possible in explaining the widespread re-
sponse to Communist appeals among the French peasant who is noted for 
his prudence and caution in the selection of candidates for office. One 
factor has already been mentioned, that of the old Jacobin tradition 
which for decades has led many peasant owners particularly in the south 
to vote for the party of the extreme Left. Their conversion to communism 
has been a fairly easy matter simplifying the task of rural Party leaders. 
An example of this pattern is seen in the voting recoro of a smaJ.l rural 
town, St. Pierre, which is leftist and anti-clerical by tradition. In 
the last election over 60 per cent voted for the Communist Party although 
St. Pierre possessed very few doctrinaire or admitted Communist Party 
members.1 Local traditions, habits . and personalities seem to be among 
the most important components determining the voter's selection of can-
didates. 
HOW'ever, the Jacobin tradition among French peasantry is not 
the only factor which bas given birth to the flourishing of communism in 
rural France. The second significant fact is the tremendous amount of 
variety within agrarian France and the direction in which French 
1. Gordon wright, "Four Red V·lllages in France", ~ Quarterly Review, 
March 1952, p. 370. 
agriculture is developing. These trends are described as fallows:1 
For the last twenty years, the number of small 
agricultural holdings has tended to decrease in favor 
of large ones: from 1929 to 1946, 880,000 small hold-
ings, about a third of the total figure, disappeared. 
And, contrary to general belief, land is unevenly 
divided in France: 383,845 farms of more than 26 
hectares, or 10 per cent of all farms, include 
19,944,825 hectares or 50 per cent of all cultivated 
land. Thus, out of every one hundred French farmers, 
the ten largest owners hold as much land as the other 
ninety. FinaJ.ly, the number of agrieul tural workers, 
tenant farmers, and m.etayers is equaJ. to the number of 
farmers who own their land. One can therefore see that, 
even if there is no agrarian problem in France at the 
moment, the position of small land-holders in France 
is nevertheless menaced. 
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The widespread belief that France is a country of small agri-
cultural producers and property owners is a fallacious one. The gradual 
disappearance of the small land owner in favor of middle-sized and large 
scale farms is the result of a slow but steady capitalist concentration 
in agriculture. The marginal land holder is unable to compete success-
i'ully with middle or large scale mechanized farming. A consequence of 
this trend is the subsistence nature of small-scale farming in France. 
A majority of the 2 million peasants in this class can do little more 
than scratch out a meager living by using the same methods that their 
ancestors used. They remain pretty much in a precapitalist stage of de-
velopment in contrast to the middle and large scale farmers who have ad-
justed to modern methods of operation and commercialization. The 
1. Einaudi, Domenach, and Garoschi, Communism in Western France, P• 126. 
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difference between backward and modern agrieul tural modes of production 
is becoming more noticeable in recent years. 
Still another problem in agrarian France is the presence of 
over a million landless farm laborers and the persistence of tenancy and 
sharecropping alongside ownership of la.nd.1 About 2001 000 of the 2 million 
small farmers are sharecroppers (metayers) and an additional 7001 000 others 
are tenants who pay cash rent.2 other landless laborers are operators or 
hired bands on larger farms. Tenancy does not always mean poverty in 
France, nor does ownership mean prosperity. Usually, however, share-
croppers, tenants of small farms and farm laborers are more susceptible 
to Communist propaganda than land holders. 
The resul. t of such variety within agrarian France and the trend 
toward large sca.l.e and medi'Wll-sized farms is a rise in tens ion and an tag-
onism among the French peasantry. Probably no other social category in 
France is so heterogeneous, so difficult to organize and so divided 
3 
against itself as the French farmer. The truly significant separation 
line that divides the ru.ra.1 producer into two numerically uneven groups 
runs between the operators of large scale or specialized farms managed on 
a modem capitalistic basis and the backward or primitive farmers who with 
obsolete methods produce very little for the market and often barely live 
above the subsistence level. The heaviest concentration of what might be 
1. Gordon Wright, 11France", European Political Systems, P• 670. 
2. ~., P• 671. 
3. Ibid.' p. 671. 
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called precapi talist farming is to be found throughout the Massif Central 
and the Mediterranean south which has already been described as being the 
focus of greatest Communist strength in rural France. · 
It is against such a background that Communist appeals to the 
rural French farmer IIDlSt be understood. Communist propaganda is cleverly 
contrived to convince the small land-holder that capitalism is squeezing 
the small producer out of existence by showing in statistical comparisons 
the decrease in the number or small farms in France over a few decades. 
Party strategists point out that half the land is already controlled by 
only 10 per cent while the other half is divided among the remaining 90 
per cent.1 They show, too, that large fanning has pretty well taken over 
certain departments to the northeast of Paris, and they predict in a 
casual manner that the process is sure to spread to the rest of France. 
The motive behind Communist appeals to the rural farmer is to stir up 
deep-seated resentments and to exploit economic dissatisfactions by 
a.naly.&ing 'alleged 1 discrepancies within the French economy rather than 
to focus attention on Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Communist propaganda 
among the peasantry contains less ideology and dogma than among any other 
group in France. It is primarily concerned with the exploitation or 
specific grievances and claims of the farmers and does not attempt to in-
doctrinate the peasant with Marxist ideology. Moreover, the Communists 
excel in fornrula ting concrete policy for various segments of the rural. 
population. All of these suggestions are specifically designed to respond 
1. "Le Parti eommuniste et la question paysanne", Paris, 1949. 
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to actual grievances and are presented in such a fashion which, besides 
their emotional appeal, appear to indicate a great amount of expert know-
ledge of the problems involved and a just solution for them. For example, 
care.f'ul attention was given to the wine growers who are suffering from a 
decrease in wine consumption and an increase in prices of fertilizers, by 
Communist "experts" who blamed the crisis on the declining purchasing 
power of the worker and the 11 high11 excise taxes levied on these farmers.1 
The sympathy of cattle and hog breeders is sought by another detailed 
analysis of their problems and proposals to solve them are set forth. 
In addition to the varied appeals to different categories of 
agricultural producers and their families constant stress is made on a 
number of economic demands which interest the rural population as a whole. 
Reduction of prices for farm implements, a generous scheme of price 
support to farm products, lower tax rates, and old-age pensions are 
among the items which appeal to all members of this group. The unifying 
theme of Conmnmist propaganda among peasants is the "struggle for peace11 
which finds a welcome audience particularly among the French peasantry 
who have the reputation for insisting on peace at almost any price. The 
sole blame for the problems and backwardness of French agricultural 
production is laid at the doorstep of two world wars. Without war every 
farmer would enjoy modem convenience, labor-saving devices and general 
prosperity. The draft is attacked by the Conmnmist Party as leading to 
1. Henry W. Eh:rma.nn, 11 The French Peasant and Conmnmism", The American 
Political Science Review, p. 32. 
47 
war as well as any defense economy which means governmental interference, 
a detested thought among French farmers. Only a retum to the policies 
of peace in the Comrmmist view will permit the farmer to renain naster 
of his land. To arouse the anger of the peasants toward the government 
comparisons are made between the huge armament expend! tures and the in-
sufficient funds going into rural investments. As soon as France aban-
dons its armaments efforts, money will be spent on the modernization of 
agricrul ture resulting in a rapid increase in product! vi ty. 
Another popular item among French peasants on the agenda of 
Conmmn1st propaganda is the criticism of the prevailing tax system (not 
usually thought of as being particularly burdensome for the farming popu-
lation) which is pushed far enough to suggest that the average producer 
need not list any tamble income. The Communists take advantage of the 
already prevailing attitude of hostility among the farmers toward any kind 
of governmental control by suggesting steps which are designed to further 
1 
a general flouting of law and order. It is noteworthy that after the 
departure of the Communists from the Ramadier cabinet their propaganda 
has become more vicious and less subtle in their attacks against the plans 
and policies of the French government. 
Since 1947, the Communists have shifted their emphasis from the 
more conciliatory and chauvinistic attitude after the Liberation to a 
dogmatic "Leninist-Stalinist" line. In 1945 and 1946 M!turice Thorez, the 
Party leader, attributed the rural success of the Party to the recognition 
1. ~., P• 31. 
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among the peasantry of the Party's "courageous fight for democracy, for 
peace and for France. 11 With the elimination of the Connm.mists from the 
French cabinet, chauvinistic outbursts were replaced by an acknowledgment 
of the need for energetic anti-government action. Once more the chanting 
of the International takes precedence over the singing of the Marseillaise, 
though not completely. An external sign of the return to Marxist dogiJB. 
was the wide-scale distribution among the peasantry of Lenin •s agrarian 
program of 1921 reproduced without alteration. Lenin made the following 
promises to the agrarian classes: 1 
a) The confiscation of all land belonging to those 
who do not cultivate it themselves, with indemnity 
only in the case of the smaller owners. 
b) The transfer of these lands and equipment to the · 
working peasants (tenant farmers, metayers, agricultural 
workers, and sma1l proprietors who have insufficient 
areas at their disposal). 
c) An absolute guarantee to small farm owners of 
continued and hereditary enjoyment of their lands. 
d) A. ban on the sale and purchase of lands in order 
to prevent their falling into the hands of capitalists 
and speculators. 
e) The transfer to the community of large estates 
having great economic importance, with a view to trans-
forming them into modern socialist enterprises. 
f) state aid for the electrification of the country-
side and the mechanization of agriculture. 
g) Support for agricultural cooperation in all its 
forms, including producers • cooperatives that, develop-
ing on the basis of the initiative and free consent of 
1. See ~ahiers 9.!! Communisme, December 1949, or Comnnmism ,m Western 
Europe, p. 126. 
the msses of working peasants, will open the way 
toward modern socialist agriculture, which is alone 
capable of bringing prosperity and social progress. 
h) A pension for all old peasants. 
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All Comnnmist ... propaganda directed toward the peasantry is well 
phrased in any discussion of the delicate question of collectivization. 
Faced with the generally accepted belief of the compulsor.y nature of 
collectivization in the Soviet Union and its eastern European satellites, 
the Comnnmists go to extreme length to point out the benefits of such an 
arrangement. Furthermore, the Comnrunists promise that collectivization 
is entirely voluntary and that the individual is free to choose between 
the cultivation of his previously OYned or newly acquired land and be-
coming a member of a collective farm. By translating the Russian 11kolkhoz" 
as "association", the Communists bring to mind traditions of French 
(Proudhonian) socialism, a more popular theme among Frenchmen, which is 
used to put the Russian system of collective farms in a more favorable 
light.1 A1 though there are frequent quotations from a variety of Russian 
authorities who guarantee that the s:uall farmers would never be compelled 
to join the "association", it is hoped that an understanding of all the 
advantages of collectivization will convince the French farmer to make 
his "free· choice11 in favor of the collective farm. The words of Stalin 
are often quoted on this point. 2 
1. Op. cit., P• 30. 
2. Waldeck Rochat, "Staline et La Question Paysanne", Cahiers 9J! 
Comrmmisme, December 1949, P• 1523. 
Qu 'on ne peut convaincre les paysans des avanta.ges 
de 1 'economie collective que si on leur montre et demontre 
en fait, par 1 'experience, que le kolkhoz est meilleur que 
!'exploitation individuelle, qu'il est plus advantageux; 
que le kolkhoz penn.et au pe.ysan, au paysan pauvre et au 
paysan moyen, de se tirer du besoin et de la mis~re. 
The problem of bridging the gulf which traditionally exists 
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between peasant and worker is another constant concern of the Communist 
Party. Tension and hostility between these two groups prevent the close 
cooperation which is essential to the attainment of Communist goals. The 
basic tenet of Stalin concerning the role of the peasantry is its trans-
formation into a reserve and ally of the working class. The importance of 
a close alliance is stressed in the propaganda directed at both groups. 
The agrarian expert of the Communist Part;y, Waldeck Rochat, made the 
following comment concerning this problem. 11 Toute 1 1histoire du mouvement 
' ouvrier nous montre que l'isolement de 1a classe ouvriere mene a la defaite, 
alorsque les paysans-travailleurs sont egalement appeles a etre ecrase par 
leur ennemis s 'ils ne s 'appuient sur la classe ouvri~re. nl In France the 
alliance encountered much opposition from both classes particularly in 
the post war years of infiation and black marketeering. In order to bring 
these two groups into closer harmony the Communists call for united re-
sistance against the common enemy or endorse a program of peace, pros-
parity and higher wages. Such propaganda, especially Communist peace 
drives, is expected to appeal simultaneously to both worker and farmer 
and is considered by CoilllJDlilist leaders to be their greatest asset. nTax 
1. Waldeck Rochat, "Pour Une Politique Agricola et Pour La Paix", 
~ Cahiers .9!! Communisme, November l948, P• 12.34. 
reductions benefiting both groups, more price support for certain agri-
cultural products, and massive wage increases to the workers are to re-
sul t in a coincident rise of urban purchasing power and rural earnings. 
Putting the national economy on a peace time footing is to provide the 
magic rod with which to finance such attractive policies,n1 
Comnnmist tactics in attracting peasant support ha*- changed 
considerably over a period of years both in party personnel and methods 
of action in view of the complications involved in solieitating their 
cooperation, Propaganda in the villages and on the farms is no longer 
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to be regaroed as the work of specialists, a former approach, but is now 
a matter of concern for the entire party. The reasons for the change 
are several, Foremost, the peasant is to be shown that his problems are 
given as much attention as those of the urban proletariat and that he 
should no longer feel any jealousy or resentment because of former Co~ 
munist preoccupation with the proletariat, In the Party's desire to 
obtain complete control over peasant propaganda at all levels, it has 
assigned to every CP rural federation a delegate from the Central Co~ 
2 
mittee. This delegate is in charge of synchronizing aJ.l Party activi-
ties with orders and directives emanating from Party headquarters, He 
has, therefore, complete supervision of Communist propaganda among the 
1, Op, cit,, p, 34. 
2, ~., P• 38. 
peasantry and is responsible directly to Party officials in Paris for 
his actions. 
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Besides strict supervision over rural Party workers, control 
was extended to the methods and scope of rural. propaganda itself. At 
least for the present, mass meetings are no longer considered the best 
media of domnnmist agitation. The uncertainty of attendance made the 
success of mass rallies unpredictable. The main emphasis for obtaining 
the rural vote is on door . to door canvassing and the distribution of the 
rural newspaper, ~ Terre. The content of La Terre includes specific in-
formation on practical and technical matters in language that the farmers 
can understand. Regional documentation is furnished by Party headquarters 
to individual propagandists and to numerous rural newspapers designed to 
answer even the most detailed questions which the farming population in 
various sections of the country might raise. This type of campaigning 
favored the atomization of the audience rather than speaking to mass 
groups. It created the impression that the Comnnmist Party cares a great 
deal about the individual problems and needs o:f each farmer giving him 
the opportunity to air his grievances to willing and sympathetic ears. 
Such an approach also permitted the fUllest use of the variegated appeals 
mentioned earlier. These techniques were largely responsible for Com-
munist successes in winning the rural vote in the 1951 elections. The 
tactic of presenting information phrased in their own language and per-
tinent to peasant needs and the method of conducting door-to-door inter-
views proved to be a valid approach in winning the sympathy of this group 
noted for its conservative taste in politics. 
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The unwillingness of the peasants to participate in trade 
unions organized by Communist rural workers necessitated the need for 
the more personal approach. The union, similar to the CGT among the 
peasantry, is the Confederation General.e d 'Agriculture (CGA) created by 
the Communists after the liberation involving the transformation of the 
old wartime Committees of Peasant Defense (Communist guerilla bands in 
rural France), into a mass front organization. However, from year to 
year Communist influence with the organization and its various subdivi-
sions has diminished, now reaching almost the vanishing point. Suc.h 
weakness in organizational representation has not loosened the Comm1nist 
grip over rural areas. One reason is that Dl8llY peasants are willing to 
have a Communist represent them in Parliament, but prefer to choose a 
hard-headed local resident with his roots firmly planted in the soil to 
speak for them in negotiations with the government or other interest 
1 groups. 
From the record of Communist success and failure among the 
French peasantry a few renarks can be made concerning the opera tiona of 
the Party in a segment of French society. Communist appeals to France •s 
peasantry- is based on the social and economic conditions shared by members 
of this group. By exploiting social and economic grievances of the rural 
fanner the Communist Party acts as a class party exploiting the frustxa-
tions which result in the perpetuation of radical traditions in French 
1. Gordon Wright, "Communists and Peasantry in France", Modern France, 
p. 229. 
54 
society. The infl.ationary character of the postwar economy, the low 
elasticity of the demand for agricultural products and the lack of credit 
have provided a common community of interests. The Communist attempt to 
mobilize the masses of French peasantry also takes on a particular hue 
because of the peculiarities of the peasant audience. These people live 
under anarchronistic economic and social condi tiona which make them 
susceptible to emotionally loaded appeals to their deeply felt, but not 
clearly analyzed resentment. 
While convincing the French peasant of the Party's interest in 
his status, the ColmllllDist Party, at the same time, must work toward 
creating unity between worker and peasant and are committed to treat the 
two groups as equal partners in the struggle for liberation. To achieve 
this end the CoDDIJWlist Party has shed its facade as a class party and 
concentrates instead on appeal;ing to the alleged nationwide bond of frus-
tration and despair which the ~o traditionally hostile social groups 
share. The dilemma of preteriding to be class party and yet pronml.gating 
the unity of the two classes presents the Co11llllllllist Party with one of its 
more serious problems. However, there has been so much discontent and 
misery among both groups that the Party has found a sufficient amount of 
material to create at least an illusory identification of interests. 
The Communist Party and the Working Class 
'· 
A1 though the Communist Party places significant stress on win-
ning the support of the rural voter, the importance of this class is 
probably outweighted by the desire to control the vote of the urban work-
ing classes. As in the case of the French peasantry, certain factors 
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played into the hands of the French Communists. Among the outstanding 
ones were the control by the Communists of the most powerful labor tmion 
in France, the CGT. Communist seizure and consolidation of the CGT took 
place during and innned:iately after Liberation. Comnnmist leaders moved 
with speed and efficiency when the labor movement emerged from the under-
grcnmd. The Conmnmist Party had men trained to take over the key posts 
~,, 
in the CGT and in a short time lotere in control of the loeal and national 
offices of the industrial federations. Communists used their newly ac-
quired posts to recruit other party members in tmion jobs. In the con-
fused and uncertain post-Liberation period, the Communists had advantages 
' in singleness of purpose 1 in techniques of infiltration and in trained 
personnel over their competitors. Such factors facilitated their rapid 
seizure of the CGT, placing them in an influential position in the post-
war period. 
Perhaps even more important than Communist domination of the 
CGT waa specific economic and social conditions which favored the accept-
ance of the Conmnmist Party among the working class. A brief sketch of 
the post-war scene in France will help one to understand the attraction 
for communism among the urban proletariat. 
After the liberation high expectations and optimism for a 
better standard of living prevailed among the working class. Because of 
its courageous activity during the Resistance, the working class had 
gained additional respect and admiration of the French people. The pro-
gram that was to distinguish the immediate post-war period beckoned labor 
to a leading role and the worker felt at long last he was gaining the 
recognition that he justly deserved by French society. The political 
climate during this period leaned toward a semi-socialistic form of 
government which would improve the status of the worker. The plans 
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which had been drawn up during the Resistance took into serious considera-
tion the prewar demands of the CGT: nationalization, national planning, 
workers' share in control of the economy, greater social security, 
democratization of recruitment for the civil service.1 It was assumed 
that the long sought reforms by the working class would be implemented 
with their cooperation and active participation in the government. The 
higher standard of living which all Frenchmen looked forward to with 
anticipation would soon be a reality after a period of making the neces-
sary sacrifices in the battle for increased production. 
However, the optimism and hope that flourished after the war 
soon gave way to apathy and a feeling of futility and hopelessness. Few 
people realized the scope and magnitude of the problems facing the French 
nation in the post-war years. Besides the task of reconstructing the 
devastated areas incurred by a major war, many old social issues were 
inherited by the Fourth Republic at its inception. Such problems as 
social security, public health, and housing had been only partially solved 
before 1940 and long postponement, together with the impact of war, made 
them more intense. 
One of the most pressing problems in post-war France is that of 
housing. Prewar neglect plus wartime destruction have forced a heavy 
1. Val R. Lorwin, "The Struggle for Control of the French Trade Union 
Movement, 1945-1949", Modem France, p. 212. 
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proportion of Frenchmen to live in antiquated apartment buildings, slums 
or cottages which lack adequate sanitary or heating facilities and which 
often are near collapse. It has been estimated that France would need to 
build 2401 000 new units annually for thirty years to catch up with the 
demand for decent housing. "By conservative estimates it (France) nm.st 
replace more than half of its 13,000,000 units within the next thirty 
years. This is equivalent to seven cities the size of Paris, with its 
3,000,000 people. A single generatiQ.D is thus faced with the task of 
housing or rehousing 2o,ooo,ooo persons, half the population of France. 111 
However, the most critical problem, by far, was the persistent 
spiral of inflation which offset all efforts to put the French eeono~ on 
a sound basis in the post-war years. In a. recent book on Europe, T. H. 
White said that French inflation 1'has underlain every modd and change of 
French politics since the war, dissolving all decencies, all moralities, 
corrupting the noblest, obsessing the conversation of all French families 
with francs, with price numbers, with worry."2 Inflation has distorted 
the French price structure and hindered efforts to insure the most effec-
tive use of her resources. Inflation has contributed to social insta-
bili ty and labor unrest, thus nourishing the seeds of comnrunism. The net 
effect of inflation has been to keep the volume of purchasing power in-
creasing more rapidly than the tClrtal volume of goods and services currently 
1. Blair Clark, 110ne-half of France is D.l-housed", ~ ~ Times 
Magazine Section, February 28, 1954, p. 50. 
2. Theodore H. White, ~ in~ Ashes, W!illia.m Sloane Associates, 
1953, P• 93. 
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available. In the case of France, an ECA. report lists the following fac-
tors as being instrumental in causing France 1s inflationa1 
(a) The heavy public and private investment expenditures. 
(b) The large budgetary deficits in Government operations, 
due on the one hand to the requirements of the invest-
ment program and the difficulty of reducing other ex-
penditures, and, on the other hand, to the considerable 
losses in tax collection resulting from the inability 
of the Government to prevent tax evasions. 
(c) The low volmne of private savings available for 
financing fixed investment. 
The inability of the government to control inflation has direct 
bearing on the workers• political attitudes and their tendency to vote 
steadily for the Communists. Inflation has kept prices above wages. It 
has caused a decline in the share of the workers• earnings in the total 
national income compared with prewar conditions in spite of the fact that 
the working class bears a large percentage of the tax burden. The Co~ 
munists have been able to make constant use of the discrepancies between 
the proportion of taxation :in comparison with the share of the worker in 
the national income. A study carried out by the CGT claims that wage 
and salary earners actually pay about 70 per cent of all personal taxes 
although they receive less than half of the national income.2 Other 
difficulties, such as food and material shortages, emphasized the decline 
in the position of the worker relative to other classes, especially in 
1. European Recovery Program, France - Country Study, Economic 
Cooperation Administration, 1949, p. 4. 
2. Gordon Wright, "France11 , European Political Systems. p. 677. 
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regard to the farmer who was used to growing his own food. Housing dif-
ficulties and overcrowding had grown much worse. The only way to compen-
sate for lack of a higher standard of living was to work longer hours and 
to have more members of the family employed than before the war. 
In the post-war period wages continued to be fixed by govern-
ment action as had been the practice during the war. The failure of the 
government to create a decent wage scale in face of inflationary trends 
led to increasing hostility and lack of faith in government progr.wns. 
The introduction of flat sum bonuses and allowances regardless of train-
ing or skill alienated the skilled and semi-skilled workers and reduced 
their incentive to acquire further training •1 The unwillingness of either 
employer or employee to accept the practice of collective bargaining did 
not help the position of the French worker and tended to leave decisions 
to government arbitrators who often did not understand the scope of the 
problems involved or e~ provide a satisfactor,y solution to them. In 
defense of the French employer it can be said that the policies and prac-
tices of the CGT in their constant use of revolutionary phraseology 
frightened away many employers from the bargaining table to the detriment 
of the trade union movement as a whole. 
At the same time the worker was struggling to maintain himself, 
he saw many industrialists and businessmen enrich themselves as the French 
bourgeosie again became solidly entrenched. The flourishing of the black 
1. Val R. Lorwin, "The Struggle for Control of the French Trade Union 
Movement, 1945-1949", Modern France, P• 213. 
60 
mrket and the almost universal profitability of business deals added in-
sult to the workers' own sense of injustice. When in 1947 the Communist 
Party left the government, it found itself in an excellent position to 
take advantage of the bitterness of the workers. The latter saw no hope 
in the program of the government to alleviate their burden and gave their 
support to the Communists as the only alternative for obtaining a more 
propitious future. The growing apathy and defeatism prevalent among the 
workers around 194 7 made the acceptability of communism an easier task 
for Communist leaders. The strongest factor favoring the success of the 
Party lay in its systematic and persistent defense of the worker, the 
"under-privileged" class in France, against those who are exploiting him. 
The establishment of all sorts of institutions for unemployment relief, 
old age assistance, legal and social advice and vacation camps proved to 
the worker that the Communist Party had his interests at heart.1 Further-
more, the very special sentiment surrounding the chief leader of the Com-
munist Party, Maurice Thorez, made the worker feel that Maurice was 
personally concerned about his future. 
The first deliberate attempt made by the Communist Party to wage 
nationwide strikes and by doing so to dislocate the whole economic system 
did not take place until the fall of 194 7. The strikes did not begin 
suddenly. As had been mentioned, there already existed the basis of 
genuine grievances and spontaneous feelings of discontent among the 
workers. This was manipulated by Communist leaders until the gathering 
1. Einaudi, Domenach, Garosci, Communism la Western Europe. p. 124. 
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momentum was whipped up into a national movement threatening the govern-
ment 1 s authority. The first wave of strikes with which Ramadier had to 
contend occurred in May and June 194 7 and was followed by further sporadic 
strikes and other movements of unrest. There were demonstrations against 
the reduction of bread rations; there were attempts in September to stop 
the passage of sugar through France to the American zone in Germany; 
there were a number of strikes for an increase in wages in mining areas 
1 
of Nord and Pas du Calais. But for the most part these were of short 
duration and were sincere movements of protest against the very difficult 
material conditions in the summer of 1947. 
The real beginning of the strike wave came in answer to dis-
missals of Communists from. the Goal Board in November 1947, which bad 
been set up by the government when coal became a nationalized industry. 
Within a few days there were some 15,000 miners on strike in the Nord 
mining region. The strike wave spread to the Ford and Renault plants 
and, as a result, the engineering union decided to call a strike throughout 
the entire industry. Communist motive in oalling the strike was a desire 
for a 20 to 25 per cent wage increase and certain eoocessions regarding 
bonuses. There was no doubt that the strikes were organized under the 
direction of Communist leaders and had the backing of Communist . news-
papers throughout their entire duration. 
1. Dorothy Pickles, French Politics, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1952, P• 82. 
e · 
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Although by the end of November over a million and a half men 
were on strike, there was evidence from various sources that the strike 
was not wholeheartedly supported by the workers. The non-Communist 
minority within the CGT opposed it from the start even though they were 
in sympathy with the claims being put forth am15eh.al.f of the workers. 
To bypass the views or the reformist element within the CGT, Communist 
union leaders set up their own strike committees ignoring regular CGT 
executive plans. In face of considerable opposition from various segments 
of the CGT, the crippling strike was announced. Factories were closed 
without consulting the views or the workers. It is wortmrhile noting 
that no general. strike order was ever issued by the CGT.1 The dissension 
gl'O\ling within the ranks of the CGT as a result of such unscrupulous 
methods was soon to split the trade union movement into two camps. 2 
Communist tactics alienated a large percentage of non-Communist union 
leaders, and led to the formation of the Force Ouvriere, a trade union 
hostile to the Communist dominated CGT. The Communists might possibly 
have held the organization of over five million men together but only by 
surrendering the principle of the Communist Party, that organized labor 
is a political weapon to be used for its own purpose. When it suited the 
Party, before the spring of 1947, to work for higher French production, 
the CGT worked toward this goal; when the Party wanted to base its 
1. .lJU.9.., P. 83. 
2. For a full description, see Walter Kerr, "French Labor Divided", 
Foreign Affairs, October 1948. 
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program on higher wages, the CGT ruled for higher wages. There was no 
consistency in the program and policies of the CGT outside the consist-
ency of the opportunistic methods used by the Communist Party. The re-
sult of such exploitation was bound to lead to dissatisfaction within 
CGT ranks, and unfortunately, ruined whatever unity remained in French 
trade union.ism. The chief problem of the FO, similar to that of the 
Socialist Party, has been the disadvantageous tactical position in which 
it has been placed. Unsupported by any political party and without funds 
the FO has been unable to provide the workers with an acceptable program. 
It has vacillated between supporting Communist demands and identifying it-
self with the policies of the government; both alternatives tended to 
alienate rather than to win the loyalty of the worker. 
The outcome of the 1947 strikes represented, on the one hand, 
an economic victory for the Communists and, on the other, a political 
victory for the government. The government granted a bonus of 1 1 500 
francs a month to all workers and agreed to carry out a revision of the 
wage scale with a view toward stabilizing prices and wages on a new level 
in accordance with Communist demands. But, otherwise, the government 
benefited from the strike for the following reasons. One was the creation 
of a non-Communist labor union friendly to the government. Another was 
the revision of the standing orders in Parliament which made it impossible 
for Communist deputies in the future to obstruct legislation by their end-
less harangues. Thirdly, the brutality of Communist methods led to the 
tightening up. of controls and police action in handling any future dis-
turbance or sabotage. MOch, Minister of the Interior, reorganized the 
police department. He purged it of Communist infiltrators and trained it 
to be ready for action at any hour, time or place with the belief that 
the civil administration of the country should be fully equipped to crush 
rebellions without resorting to martial law. The extremes of violence 
which the Communists employed in this strike and subsequent ones were 
without precedence in the tradition of French trade unionism. One custom 
which had been unfailingly observed even in the fiercest battles, namely, 
that plants and tools must be safeguarded, was broken for the first time 
in the history of French unionism. "The maintenance squads to which 
Communists had been elected often refused to fulfill their tasks. Pumps 
were not set working and pits were flooded; fires were not kept up and 
coke furnaces were damaged. nl Another consequence was the dismissal of 
Communists appointed by the Communist Minister of Industrial Production, 
M:trcel Paul, from their jobs on the ooard of directors of various 
nationalized industries. 
In spite of these setbacks the Communists launched another 
wave of strikes a year later which were more serious in intensity than in 
1947. The strikes began in the coal mines on October 4, 1948, and spread 
to other . industries. There were two reasons for calling a strike; the 
low level of wages and allowances in comparison with rising prices and 
t he dismissals of Communists from positions in the committees of national-
ized industries which were being carried out in accordance with the 1947 
1. Andre Geraud, "Insurrection Fades in France", Foreign Affairs, 
October 1949, P• 33. 
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1 decrees. But negotiations on both questions were in progress when the 
strike began and the non-Communist unions maintained that a settlement 
could have been reached without resorting to a strike. Responsibility 
for instigating the strike belonged almost entirely to the Communist 
element within the CGT. In fact, evidence was later brought out that the 
strike was organized by the Communist Party in response to a command given 
by Zdhanov to sabotage Marshall Plan aid by all possible means.1 Strikes 
were to be timed to begin at the end of September and the Cominform was 
to finance both miners and dockers. According to Cominform directives 
every effort was to be made tO stop the military recovery of France. At 
the time the Minister of the Interior was M. Mach. He informed the 
National Council of the Socialist Party of the evidence he had received, 
which he felt substantiated the connection between the strikes and 
Cominform orders. 
Even without the specific data furnished by the government, the 
conduct of the strike would have revealed sufficient evidence to prove 
this connection. When it looked after a week or so as if it might end, 
not only were forcible measures taken by the Communist leaders of the 
strike to stop the men from going back to work, but the CGT refused to 
hold a fresh ballot and instead endorsed a new and more serious protest 
movement. On October 18, the CGT declared a strike of the maintenance 
services, at first for 24 hours and a day later without time limit.2 A 
1. ~ Times, October 12, 1948, P• 4, col. 4. 
2. Dorothy Pickles, French Politics, p. 104. 
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strike of this sort was unprecedented and Socialist ministers reminded 
the strikers that it had never happened before in the history of the 
trade union movement, not even during the German occupation. In the 
Loire engineers reported that there would be flooding in some mines i£ 
the pumps were left lmma.nned for as long as six to eight hours and in 
others after 24 hours. 
From this point en there were serious clashes with Comnnmist 
strikers when police and troops occupied the mines in order to keep them 
in working order. 11There were forty-seve:n instances of sabotage during the 
strike, either in mines or on the railway, and 367 serious attacks either 
on miners or on their houses. • • .Nearly 1,000 were arrested, 25 
foreigners were deported, and there were some 300 convictions. ul 
Approximately 3001 000 of France's 3491 000 miners were on strike 
for some or all of the six weeks, and there were other strikes in which 
railwa;ymen, dockers, seamen, and steel workers participated during the 
same period. 2 After a week or so there was a slight drift of workers 
back to their jobs, but in the middle of October a new and violent phase 
began with clashes between strikers and police and casualties on both 
sides. After this there was a stronger drift of men back to work. The 
strike was virtually over and most of the men were already at their jobs 
when it was officially called off on November 27. With the ending of the 
strike, France enjoyed a period of industrial peace. It was not until 
the spring of 1950 that strikes were renewed on any considerable seal.e. 
1. ~~~ P• 105. 
2. ~., P• 105. 
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An analysis of the miners' attitUde toward the 1948 strike in 
the region of Pas du Calais reveals that 70 per cent of the miners are 
members of the CGT and accepted Comnn.mist leadership not out of any feel-
ing for Communist propaganda or doctrines, but out of desperation.1 
There was no alternative in their opinion for them but to quit work until 
the government agreed to pay a scale which would enable them to live 
decently. Common to all of · them, Socialist, Communist or neutral, was a 
feeling of despair and disgust with the government and a surprising bitter-
ness against the United States for assisting the French government in pro-
viding arms to crush the strike. Their major grievance was the decree of 
Lacost pronmlgated on September 13, 1948, whereby guaranteed minimum wages 
were terminated and the men were put on a piece-work basis. This left a 
nan's earnings up to the discretion of the foreman. The feeling prevalent 
among the miners is that they were forced into accepting communism by 
social and economic conditions and political trends. While they swallowed 
Communist propaganda, they did not identify the:msel ves with doctrinaire 
dogma common to militant Party members, and would break with the Communist 
Party if it sought to interfere with traditional French liberties or 
placed the interests of Russia before those of France in a crucial test.2 
Strikes organized by Communist union leaders began again in 
1950. The movement started with Communist-inspired strikes mainly in 
French ports, ostensibly in protest against the war in Indo-China. 
1. Raymo:nd D&niell, "The French Miners: A ease Study of COlDilllmjsm." 
~York Times Magazine Section, November 14, 1948, P• 14. 
2. ~., P• 105. 
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Comnnmist hostility against the Indo-Chinese war was not new, but in 1950 
it took on more violent overtones. Ruthless tactics practiced by French 
CoDD.lDlllists were the deliberate sabotage of consignment of arms and an 
attempt to tie up the peace campaign with domestic issues. One aspect 
of the desire to hamper the war in Indo-China was the agitation against 
American shipment of arms to France for defense purposes. 11 'The receipt 
of American war material, 111 said M. Charles Tillon, at the Gonmnmist 
Party Congress in April 1950, It I means that French blood has been prom-
ised by our rulers to their bellicose masters. The entire party must be 
mobilized to impose peace. 11•1 As a part of their 11:mGbilization" program. 
the Communists encourage the sabotage of material on the railways and 
attempts to prevent dockers from loading ships bound for Indo-China. 
Another motive for the outbreak of strikes was to stir up 
waning enthusiasm for the ColDIIItlllist Party in the trade unions. There 
had been evidence of apathy and lack or interest in Comnnmist propaganda 
for some time, not merely among the workers, but also among Communist 
1mion leaders. Party reports revealed a fall in membership and in the 
sale of Communist periodicals. Communist union leaders were accused of 
tailing to win the support or the worker by Party headquarters and repri-
manded for their shortcomings. A general strike was supposed to wake up 
the worker from his lethargy or create a change of attitude on his part 
toward supporting the Communist Party. 
1. Ibid., P• 1221. 
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This time the govemment was prepared to move quickly and de-
eisi vely against the strikers to prevent sabotage and the boycotting of 
the manufacture and transport of war materi8.1. Since the objective of 
the strikes was to hamper national defense, they could be declared un-
constitutional which meant that employers would be justified in dismiss-
ing strikers for breach of contract. State employees were informed by 
the government that striking in these circumstances would be considered 
as a basis for cancelling contracts. But strikes ostensibly for wage 
increases only, were held to be legal and were protected by constitutional. 
guarantee. 
The 1950 strikes were or varying duration. Whether they ful-
filled Communist expectations ip their test of Communist leadership in 
the unions is not known, but they were admirably organized for that pur-
pose. The extent to which strike orders were obeyed varied from place 
to place, and yet the same tendency of the wo~ers to slowly drift back 
to work occurred as in previous years. By the beginning of Apr:ll the 
strikes were, for the most part, over. 
One outcome of the 1950 strikes was the passage of the Anti-
Sabotage Bill in the National Assembly. "The bill provided for periods 
of penal servitude, not only for sabotage, but also for destruction of 
1 
arms and attempts to weaken national defense by demoralizing the army." 
The increasing determination of the government to squelch future uprisings 
and the unwillingness of the workers to allow themselves to be victimized 
1. 11?jg,.' p. 124. 
70 
by Communist appeals were indications that Communist strength in French 
trade unions was on the wane. 
The lack of responsiveness to Communist propaganda in the trade 
unions has been the principal reason for the absence of strikes since 
1950. The recent strike ef April 28, 1954 was admitted by Benoit Franchon, 
Comnnmist head of the CGT, to be a failure. He said at the Nationa.l Con-
gress of the Frencli Communist Party held on June 12, 1954, that only a 
small part of the working class was ready to follow the movement. Despite 
' 
the setbacks in the trade unions, the hold of the Communist Party on the 
voting habits of the workers is considerable. Lack of acceptable altema-
tives have enabled the Party to remain a formidable force in the political 
and social affairs of the nation. 
A. desire to free the worker from the influence of communism 
to 
has led the worker-priest movement, an extension of the missionary activi-
ties of the regularly ordained Roman Catholic clergy men who have, as 
their purpose, the rechristianization of the largely Communist dominated 
working class people of France's industrial cities. Worker-priests were 
sent to work fall time in the factories, mines, and light industrial plants 
of France where they acted and lived exactly as other workers did. How-
ever, it was not long before a feud between the Cardinal of Faris and the 
members of the movement arose over the desirability. of clergymen in this 
kind of work.1 A more basic question than that of church discipline is 
1. See nparis Dispatch: The Church and the 1-Behine", The New Republic, 
April 5, 1954. 
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whether priests or anyone else for that matter can fight communism on 
its awn ground using in some instances its own weapons without being 
tainted or corrupted from it and hence causing communism to spread. 
There has been no doubt that a number of priests did succumb to the 
Party line as is revealed by the arrest of several who participated in 
the demonstration against the arrival of Ridgeway on May 28, 1952. It 
seems that the only way to win the worker away from communism is to pro-
vide more opportunities and a higher standard of living which would 
eliminate the apathy, resentment and frustration on which communism 
thrives. 
From a study of ColllillUilist success and failure among the working 
class some pertinent observations can be drawn. The appeal of the Commun-
ist Party among the working class appears to stem from the di:fficul. t econo-
mic and social condi tiona in post-war France. The recognition among 
workers of class stratification in French society serves to unite them 
.against forms of exploitation and oppression, material as well as moral 
by other social classes. This class consciousness has enabled the Com-
munist Party to propagate a mystical and doctrinal identification between 
it and the working class. The Communist Party promotes working class unity 
as a necessary prerequisite for its own existence. A loss of contact 
between the Party and the worker would seriously jeopardize the future 
position of the Comnnmist Party in France. 
There are other factors which have played into Communist 
hands in regard to the French working class movement. The symbols of 
French syndicalism have been manipulated by Communist leaders to win 
support among the workers. These are the concept of the general strike, 
the belief in the efficacy of violence, the importance of the myth, and 
the willingness to die a heroic death for one's beliefs.1 MOst important 
among these symbols is the necessity for a violent upheaval to effect 
change, if change is to take place. The Communists have been able to 
take a position which places them squarely within this tradition. 
However, the awareness among workers that the Comnnmist Party 
is willing to espouse its cause and yet exploit its needs to suit the 
Party's own interests has led to a reluctance among workers to partici-
pate in Communist sponsored strikes. In spite of the ability of the 
French Co:mnmnist Party to utilize the myths of French syndicalism and 
to exploit the class struggle, neither factors are sufficient in themselves 
to promote the Communist cause. The flagrant disregard for human lives 
and property during the 1947 and 1948 strikes discouraged and disgusted 
workers from joining the strike movement with any enthusiasm. The 
creation of the Force Ouvriere seriously split and weakened French trade 
unionism with the result that the worker felt somewhat apathetic when 
either union made an effort to solicit his support. 
Despite the lack of responsiveness among the working class 
toward French trade unions, election returns reveal that a surprisingly 
large number of the working class support the Communist Party. An 
explanation for the continued popularity of the Party on election day is 
due to the lack of sufficient alternatives among French political parties 
and their failure to understand the particular needs of the French worker. 
1. Glenn E. Hoover, "Evolutionary Socialism, Syndicalism, Guild Socialism 
and Anarchism." Twentieth Century Political Thought. Edited by Joseph 
s. Roucek, Philosophical Library, 1946, p. 8. 
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The Freneh Communist Party and the Intellectuals of France 
An analysis of French social classes and their particular motives 
for supporting the French Communist Party cannot be understood without 
mentioning the role of the French intellectuals. Although the French 
fanner and worker outweigh the intellectuals numerically and in the at-
tention given to them by the Party, this group lends prestige and pro-
vides the intellectual framework ~octhe Party's philosophy and prog~. 
Support of the Communist Party by intellectuals may seem somewhat 
paradoxical. The French intellectual class does not usually suffer from 
material deprivation as does the farmer and worker. They possess a 
position of prestige and influence in French society. Their contribution 
to western culture has been prized by the French people who place great 
emphasis on cultural achievements. In view of their status in French 
society, it is of special interest to understand why the French intellec-
tual is attracted by the Communist Party. Analyzing their motives becomes 
essential in the attempt to explain different reasons for supporting the 
Communist Party in France. 
The attraction for the Communist Party in the post-war period 
can partly be understood in terms of the strains and stresses that result 
from a major war.1 The post-war period in France was beset by a host of 
problems to which there were no easy or ready-made solutions. The mul-
tiplicity of economic and social problems which seemed to overwhelm France 
created a feeling of helplessness, frustration, and despair. In addi-
tion to social and economic difficulties France was undergoing a process 
1. Charles A. Micaud, "French Intellectuals and Communism. 11 Social 
Research, Autumn, 1954, P• 286. 
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of change where existing institutions and practices were no longer found 
applicable to today 1s world. This transitional period was not limited to 
France. However, it affected France harder because of her tendency to 
live in the past and to postpone adjusting to current situations. The 
crisis did not only exist in economic and social spheres; it reverberated 
in the cultural realm. The failure of France to maintain meaningful ideals, 
expectations and hopes and to keep its social cohesion was reflected in the 
attitudes of French philosophers and writers. The challenge to and re-
je ction of values which, at one time, were believed to be valid resulted 
in the flourishing of nihilism. Nihilism epitomized the deep sense of 
anguish, despair and hopelessness which were a consequence of the inability 
to find any meaning in the existing social order. Existentialism became 
an expression of this crisis. It was an attempt to find reasons for the 
irrationality of human ·behavior and for acting according to standards in 
a world where the individual is no longer sustained by moral values and 
codes or a sense of destiny. 
One escape from the dilemma of uncertainty, doubts and anxieties 
was to join a party which was able to provide a dynamic purposeful philos-
ophy and could present to its members a rationale for discrepancies and 
social injustices. The French Communist Party offered the intellectual 
effective outlets for his frustrated state of mind. It gave him faith, 
purpose, and a sense of conmnmity. It allowed him to submit and submerge 
himself in a 11 superior force of oveiWhelming strength and efficiency" 
contrasted with other French political parties. It enabled him to fulfill 
his potentialities as an intellectual. 
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Thus, one outstanding characteristic of some intellectuals ' 
support of connnunism is their own sense of inadequacy, a feeling of guilt 
in their failure to find fulfillment or satisfying outlets for their 
intellectual endeavors. This is obvious in the writings of men like 
Mounier, Camus, M9.lraux and in the behavior of Existentialists, Person-
alists, and Christian Progressives. Intellectuals have rejected cap-
- ,' 
italism for its vacillations, its inability to fUrnish the security they 
cherish. Some have turned to comrmmism in the desire for order and ac-
tion in which they can participate. 
However, becoming a member of the Comnnmist Party was not 
usually completely satisfying to these intellectuals. They could not 
resolve the many contradictions which Party membership imposed on them. 
The desire to obey and to rebel against authority, the need to believe 
and to doubt, the eagerness to be absorbed and the wish for self-asser-
tion, the moral code of the Party and Christian ethics contributed~ rather 
than alleviated -&8. the conflicts of the intellectual. It is for these 
reasons that many intellectuals left the Co:mmimist Party. It seems that 
the original commitment represents a deep-felt need to find an accept-
able and satisfying place in their own society rather than an affiliation 
for communist principles. 
76 
THE ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY 
The ability of the Communist Party t0 wage strikes and to carry 
out its other activities cannot be understood apart from an analysis of the 
organization and leadership of the French Connnunist Party. In a sense, 
the real strength of the Communist Party in France resides in its devoted 
militants and paid officials who work both in the Party organization and 
in the French trade unions. They form the hard core of the Party and: are 
men of courage and determination capable of an enormous amount of work 
on behalf of the Party. The highly centralized and well-disciplined corps 
of men and women trained to act swiftly and effectively on immediate 
notice enables the Communist Jarty to operate with maximum efficiency. 
Swift action necessitates the indoctrination of its members and demands 
blind obedience to the dictatorial orders of commanding officers. The 
compulsory obligation of the subordinate to carr.y out directives given 
him without question constitutes both an asset and a disadvantage in the 
operations of the Conmnmist Party in France. In order for the Party to 
survive in France it DDlSt be able to attract new members to its ranks who 
are willing to abide by its rules and to accept the rigid discipline de-
manded by Party officials. It is with this particular problem in mind 
which is basic to the success of any totalitarian movement that an 
analysis of the effectiveness of Communist organizational structure will 
be made. 
The outstanding advantage of the French Communist Party over 
other political parties democratically organized lies in its well devised 
and complex hierarchical arrangement of Party memvership and in its program 
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of activities. Whereas the majority of political parties are active 
chiefly during election time, the activities of the Communist Party are 
continuous, intensive, widespread and well co-ordinated. Essential to 
the success of Party operations is the absolute necessity for the secret 
planning of activities. Secrecy eliminates the risk of leakage of orders, 
avoids the possibility of dissension within Communist ranks, and lessens 
the opportunity for a challenge to Communist leadership among subordinates. 
Secrecy guarantees to Conmnmist leadership that orders will be obeyed 8Ild 
hence gives the Party its swift power to strike when and where it pleases. 
To insure the continuance of secrecy in Party operations and 
activities and the continued penetration of French society by Party members, 
the Communist Party is meticulously and elaborately organized on both a 
verticaJ. and horizontal plane. Horizontally, the Central Connnittee or 
administrative bureau is divided into several sections which supervise 
specific kinds of work. For example, there is a section for the central 
organization of the Party, one for agitation and propaganda and another 
for the train:illg of cadres.1 The training and indoctrination of new re-
cruits is considered to be one of the highly important responsibilities of 
the Party. New members take up the following subjects during their training 
2 period. 
Students learn about problems of organization, admini-
stration, and methods of agitation and propaganda. They 
practice public speaking and the technique of public debating, 
they leam how to make up a poster and write an article, how 
1. Einaudi, Domenach and Garosci, Comnnmism in Western Europe. p. 83. 
2. Charles A. Micaud, "Organization and Leadership of the French Conmnmist 
Party." ~ Politics, April, 1952, P• 344. 
to organize a cell, a section, a public meeting, a demon-
stration, a dance, or an election campaign. 'While at school, 
students participate in the life of the party. They are 
sent as delegates to party conferences and speak at public 
meetings. They address workers at the gate of the factory. 
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In this way good agitators can be selected, while those who 
prove incapable are directed to other kinds of work. The fin-
ished product is highly efficient. There are hundreds of 
section and federal secretaries who can rout a parliamentarian 
in a public debate. The evidence indicates that the graduates 
of Communist schools are much better trained both in theory 
and practice than the graduates of the schools of other parties. 
Besides the distribution of specific activities into sections 
or committees, the Communist Party conducts an elaborate system of propa-
ganda and press activities. In the past years the Communist Party has 
exerted a more continuous and vigorous propaganda campaign than other 
parties through the publication of a variety of newspapers and magazines. 
Besides the Parisian dailies, 1 1Humanite and Ce Soir, the Party controls 
1 
important regional papers and ov~r 100 weeklies. However, recent figures 
reveal that the popularity of the Camnnmist press has sharply declined.2 
The party 1 s chief newspaper, 1 1Humani te, published 
6oo,ooo copies daily in 1946 but circulation has gradually 
fallen to 190,000. In 1946 there were thirty-four Conmnmist 
dallies with a combined circulation of 1 1 840,000; today 
thirteen are left, with a bare 600,000 in circulation~ In 
1939 the Communist dailies accounted for five per cent of 
the total circulation of the French press; in 1946 they 
represented 23 per cent; today the figure has shrunk to 12 
per cent. 
On the vertical level the French Communist Party is highly 
centralized as regards to political direction but otherwise highly de-
centralized in its organization. At the peak of the hierarchy is the 
political bureau composed of thirteen men and a secretariat composed of 
1. Op. Cit., P• 95. 
2. Jules Moch, "A Frenchman's Cure for French Communism." New York Times 
Magazine Section, May 23, 1954, p. 8. 
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five men with Maurice Thorez possessing supreme power. These polia,y 
making officials are presumably responsible to the eight-member Central 
Committee which, in tum, is elected at the biennial Party Congress com-
posed of delegates from the local chapters. The instructions of the 
Central Committee and its political bureau radiate downward to the leaders 
in the lower echelons which are as follows: the federation, the region, 
1 
the section, the district, and the local cells. Leadership on each 
echelon is designated and controlled by the echelon just above it. The 
base l.mits or local cells are wholly isolated from each other and, at 
least in theory, ignorant of one another's existence. Each of the cells 
relies for all its communications within the cell to which it is assigned. 
Unawareness of other units results in communications which either move 
upward or downward but never on a horizontal level. This arrangement 
has two benefits. Besides reducing security risks, it pennits a sur-
prisingly high percentage of Party members to act in one context or 
another as leaders. 
The complete isolation of operating units on the vertical 
level along with the professed flexible character in which cell meetings 
are conducted have enabled the ,Communists to claim that the Party is 
organized on a democratic basis. "Democratic centralism" is held by the 
2 French Communist Party to be the guiding principle of Party organization. 
Communist leaders define "democratic centralism" as the right of all bodies 
to freely elect their officers, to discuss and to execute their own deci-
1. ~., P• 83. 
2. ~., P• 81. 
80 
sions. However, the hard realities of Party operations reveal a differ-
ent picture. Any decision made by a higher echelon is considered ab-
solutely binding on a subordinate one. Within each unit Party factions 
are prohibited and competing centers for power outlawed. In essence the 
organizational pattern of the French Communist Party is similar to a 
military hierarchy in which policy directives come from the central 
command and the subordinate is obliged to carry them out. 
Because the cell is the basic unit of the French Communist 
Party, an understanding of its particular role and function is of ut-
:mOst importance. In theory the cell meets at least once a week. In 
practice it may meet less frequently. It is composed of a minimum of 
three members and a maximum of sixty but usually is subdivided when it 
grows larger than thirty. Its meetings are private and are conducted, 
of course, in secrecy. The typical cell has the following program of 
activities.1 
1) It discusses the existing political and economic 
situati0n on the basis of the known facts and in the 
light of the directives that have been received, in 
order to train its members ideologically. 
2) It conducts party propaganda and recruitment, dis-
tributes party publications, and spreads directives 
according to techniques to be examined later. 
3) It intervenes in the life of the factory or the 
town on all possible occasions and with all possible 
means; union elections, factory committees, strikes, 
the struggle against unemployment, the defense of 
tenants and the defense of the aged. 
Basic to Communist psychology regarding the function of the cell 
is the belief that face-to-face contact of its members will create a 
1. ~., P• 85. 
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binding and personal esprit de corps among recruits. Intimate ties among 
human beings are encouraged rather than depending on the impersonality of 
written instructions. Furthe:nnore, the intimacy of the cell fosters the 
development of a new society based on new ties and mores. In order to 
fashion an effective movement, the Communists found that the individual 
had to be broken free from the network of primary ties of family, church, 
and community and held together in a new and closely knit association. 
The compactness of the cell served this purpose. 
The program of activities and general policy of the cell and 
other units are determined by high ranking officials in the Communist 
Party at Paris headquarters. In general, leaders of the French Connmmist 
Party are not idealistic visionaries but middle-aged revolutionists and 
veteran administrators. Leadership in the Party provides them with private 
villas, chauffeurs, and body guards. All these prerequisites plus the 
enormous pOW'er and glamour attached to their lofty position are not, how-
ever, truly theirs. Such privileges are the gift of the Party and leaders 
enjoy them for only as long as they remain in the Party 1 s good graces. 
Because of the tremendous power the top officials of the French 
Communist Party wield, a continuous rivalry for the key position goes on. 
This rivalry arises partly out of clashing personal aspirations and partly 
out of the manipulation of these ambitions by MoscOW' authorities. For 
some twenty years the leadership of the French Communist Party has been 
shared by Marty and Thorez with Thorez holding top priority. The recent 
castigation of 1:-Brty along with Tillon indicates the fear of one or the 
other becoming powerful enough to take the leadership away from Thorez. 
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All Party privileges were taken away from both ousted members. The main 
reason for Marty 1 s expulsion was personal antipathy for Thorez. In regal'd 
to Tillon the motivation was different. His tendency to object to Mosccrw 
control made him a marked man. A welter of charges were brought against 
him but the most obvious one was his reluctance to follow Moscow directives. 
Along with the ouster of Till on and Marty came the warning from Moscow 
that French Communist leaders DnlSt be efficient and docile. The task of 
Thorez remained clear. He nn1st stamp out all warfare within Communist 
ranks and make sure that the Party remained an instrument of total servil-
ity to the interests of Moscow. The risk of establishing an independent 
line from the Kremlin had to be avoided at all costs. 
The willingness of Thorez to adhere to the dictates of Moscow 
and the strict supervision maintained over the French CoiDIIIUDist Party by 
the Soviets lessen the likelihood of Titoism taking hold in France. 
Because the conquest of power by the French Communist Party is certain to 
precipitate a military crisis in France, French Communist leaders ::tand to 
gain rather than to lose through an identification with the Kremlin. The 
French Communists are aware that the Red A~ constitutes the most likely 
source of military power which they will need to bring about a successful 
revolution. The possibility of using the Red Anny is sufficient reason 
to make continued support attractive to French Communist leaders. Other 
factors influencing their decision to keep in close contact with Moscow 
are the financial assistance and the opportunities for advanced training 
that the Kremlin provides for its associates. 
The close identification with ~scow and the strict discipline 
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exercised over members of the Party by its leaders has disadvantages. 
According to official figures released at a Party Congress on Jtme 5, 
1954 the French Communist Party has lost nearly half of its members dur-
ing the past seven years.1 Membership dropped from 789,459 in 1948 to 
506,353 in 1954.2 The explanation for this abnormal fall in membership 
by Communist officials themselves was that the Party was no longer at-
t racting young people and that it had been unsuccessful in stirring up 
1I¥iSS interest. M. Servin, a Party delegate to the Congress, called on 
the other delegates to make a special effort to solicit the support of 
the working classes. He stressed the need for increased Communist acti-
vities in factories and the recruitment of workers into Com.nnmist dom.i-
na ted unions. 
The principal worry of Communist officials at the meeting was 
t heir recognition that young people no longer were joining the Party. 
According to M. Servin only 11 per cent of the membership were under 25 
years of age) The lack of enthusiasm among young people constitutes the 
most serious threat to the continued survival of the Communist Party in 
France. In regard to the inadequate response of young people to Communist 
appeals mention should be made of the blow to the Party's reputation when 
heroes of the Resistance, such as Marty and Tillon, were dismissed from 
the Party. 
other reasons for the drop in Communist Party membership stem from 
the mood of indifference and lethargy prevalent among the French population 
1. ~ Christian Science Monitor, June 5, 1954, p. 4. 
2. ~., P• 4 
3. ~., P• 4. 
in post-lo~ar France. HOW"ever, the Party has undoubtedly suffered also 
because of its unswerving subservience to the demands of the Soviet 
Union. The subsequent isolation into which it has been regarded as a 
group has added to its unpopularity. 
The pressures which are exerted by Moscow on French Comnnmist 
leaders and, in tum, their demands of Party militants often prevent 
the smooth operations of the Party in France. The disadvantages of a 
party organized on a tota.li tarian basis may outweigh the assets although 
it is too early to predict in the case of the CoiiDD.unist Party in France. 
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THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF FRANCE 
The tenden~ of the French Communist Party to identify itself 
with the policies of the Kremlin is made explicit in the attitude of the 
Party toward the international affairs of France. Since 194 7 the French 
Communist Party has usually supported Soviet policies and opposed the 
major policies of the French government. The principal instruments avail-
able for the expression of Communist views are substantial representation 
in Parliament, control of the CGT, and propaganda. Of all three, propa-
ganda is by far the most forceful outlet for Communist demands and denun-
ciations. The central questions to be considered in an appraisal of the 
attitude of the French Communist Party toward French foreign policy are, 
namely, what are the main points of view espoused by the French Comnnmist 
Party and to what extent they find a sympathetic audience among the French 
population. 
Among the various themes in Communist propaganda, the appeal to 
anti-German sentiment is by far the strongest in the post-war period. 
There is endless repetition that a revived Germany constitutes the great-
est threat to world peace and by support:ing any plan involving Germany on 
an equal footing with France a major catastrophe may occur. The Comnnmists 
denounce Germany's entrance into the European Defense Conmnmi ty. They de-
nounce all proposals of a western union or European federation including 
Gennany by comparing them to Hitler's plan to establish a Greater Reich but 
this time with American support. The fear of a renewed industrial Gernany 
menacing French :industry through its competition and French security through 
its militarism is also given ample attention by the Communist press. 
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The Communists have insisted on denazification, demilitarization, 
decentralization, and reparations in accordance with the Potsdam agreement 
which, in their opinion, has been violated by the United States. Agita-
tian for reparations and denunciation of the American and British policy 
for abandoning payments from Germany are designed to increase popular sup-
port by nationalistic appeals and to create antagonism within ·France against 
the French government for not insisting on reparations. 
In regard to the Ruhr, the French Communist first supported the 
official French policy in its demand for the political and economic inter-
nationalization of the area involving detachment from Germany.1 When 
Molotov denounced any dismemberment of the Ruhr in favor of control by all 
the allies, the Co:rmmmist also shifted their line and demanded inter-
allied control over the Ruhr. The overt purpose was that such control 
would assure the French people that Germany would never menace world peace. 
However, if participation of the Soviet Union were brought to the Ruhr 
and the Rhine, it could be used to promote communism in France as well as 
in Germany and a new foothold would be gained in a very potent area. 
More specifically, the French Communists demanded a peace 
settlement with Genna.ny approved by all four of the major powers and the 
establishment of a democratic government for the whole of Germany in which 
all democratic parties and organizations are represented.2 In this 
respect their views are identical with those of the Kremlin. Such 
similarity bears out the close association between Moscow and the head-
1. Vemon Van Dyke, "The Communists and the Foreign Relations of France." 
Modem France, edited by E. M. Earle, p. 2.38. 
2. ~., P• 2.3.3. 
? ... -r~. 
quarters of the French Communist :Aeati-qUareeP&. 
The number one enemy singled out by the Communists in their 
propaganda is the United States whom they brand as the modem fascists. 
Fear of a revived Germany is coupled with American imperialism: which, 
through manipulating Germany in its own fashion, is striving for world 
conquest. The Marshall Plan is bitterly attacked as interfering with the 
internal affairs of the French government causing the colonization of 
France by American businessmen. Collaboration with the United States 
according to Communist propaganda is leading to a subservient position 
of France in the international field. Though the Communists cannot say 
that France has not profited by the Marsba.ll Plan, they contend that in 
general ERP has weakened the French economy and interfered with French 
soverei~ty. The Marshall Plan, in their viev, is an imperialistic at-
tempt to cause the colonization of France forcing France to import 
American goods and resulting in the impoverishment of French industry. 
Only the capitalists have benefited by the Marshall Plan while the workers 
and peasants hav~ suffered. A lowering of the tariff is also condemned 
because it will facilitate the dumping of American goods in France and 
will cause the bankruptcy of French industries which cannot compete with 
those of the United States. 
The most persuasive theme in Communist propaganda is that present 
day French policy undermines the national independence of France.1 Accord-
ing to Thorez the French people no longer have the right to have a govem-
ment of their own choice. The composition and orientation of French 
1. Ibid., P• 241. 
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cabinets will be determined in Washington, not Paris. Thorez substantiates 
this po:int by sa~c that the re-admission of the Conmnmist Party to the 
cab:inet would deprive France of American aid, and concludes that French 
sovereignty is a meaningless term. When Ramadier dismissed the Communists 
from his cabinet, they at first regarded it as an ordinar,y ministerial 
crisis. Soon after, however, they condemned Ramadier•s move as an indica-
tion of the 11bruta.l intervention of American imperialists.111 At the same 
time, the French Comnnmists are also vehemently opposed to the Brussels 
Pact, the North Atlantic Pact, and the Council of Europe pointing out 
that France is subordinating herself to the interests of America. 11 'In 
short, they conclude, France is 1 in the presence of a foreign invasion • 
and French policy 'has been strictly subordinated to the American policy 
2 
o:f aggression.'" 
Superficially there might be a contradiction betw"een the 
Comnmnists 1 own goal. o:f proletarian internationalism and strict insistence 
on the preservation of the national independence and sovereignty of France. 
The Comnnmists explain any conflict between proletarian internationalism 
and national sovereignty by saying that the French bourgeosie and govern-
ing cliche have betrayed the French people. Political control, the 
Comrmmists feel, is lodged in _a small minority who are not essentially 
interested in the welfare of France. The bourgeosie nations are driven 
by fear, the fear of the rising working class and fear of uprisings for 
liberation throughout the French empire. Evidence of this fear was seen 
1. Ibid., P• 241. 
2. ~., P• 241. 
in the colonial war in Indo-China.. The ruling classes are impelled to seek 
safety in international security pacts to maintain their losing position. 
Since the working class is the bulwark of the nation and since the 
Communist Party represents the working class it follows that, in the view 
of Thorez and his followers, that only the Communist Party sincerely rep-
resents the best interests of France. To French Communists their _Party 
is at the same time nthe Party of the working class, the Party of' the 
people, and .the Party of the Nation."1 
From the Collllll\mist point of view the idea of preserving national 
:independence is significant only in relation with the _capitalist world 
since the threat to national security is caused by it. As far as the 
workers are concerned there is no conflict of interests in different na-
tions. The French Communists have been able to portray the ~oviets as in 
no way interfering with the internal affairs of their satellites or ~ 
pairing the sovereignty of them. However, the French Communists admit 
that their championship of French independence is only a policy based on 
expediency. Once the bourgeosie have been overthrown a union of all 
countries vi th the 1 socialist motherland 1 can be effected. For the time 
being, though, isolating the French bourgeosie from an alliance with the 
non-Coil11lllllist world is the primary aim of Communist propaganda. I:r 
France can be prevented from participating in economic and political 
cooperation with the West, France will be in a weakened condition and can 
be more easily overthrown. 
1. :tvnurice Thorez, Au Service Du Peuple Be France. Paris, 1947, p. 66. 
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ln the post-war period these have been the various themes which 
the French Comnnmist Party has used intermittently in its propaganda cam-
pa.igns. It is difficult to evaluate the success which the Connmmists have 
achieved in the propagation of their views and to predict with accuracy 
what degree of success they have in prospect. The constant stress on 
anti-German feelings has had some effect. It has mitigated against the 
acceptance by France of measures looking towerd the reestablishment or 
Germany and the entry of Germany into a Western European system. How-
ever, the anti-German sentiment in France exists quite independently of 
the French Coilllllllllists. There is no way of mowing to what extent opposi-
tion to measures involving Germany springs from Communist propaganda and 
to what extent it comes from other sources. Recognition of the strong 
anti-German feeling among the French population bas given the French 
Communists a powerful weapon with which to influence public opinion, re-
gardless of general attitude of the French t011ard the Communist Party. 
The ability of the French Communist Party to support any group in spite 
of its political affiliation which is opposed to Germany's entrance into 
' 
the European Defense Community lends validity to the Party's own opposition. 
The French Communist Party is presently waging a very subtle game cooperating 
with left-wing and right-loring parties to prevent any European defense 
alliance from becoming a reality.1 Whether the Part,ywill succeed or not 
is not easy to forecast at this time. The fact that so liDlCh opposition 
to EDC exists in France gives the French Comnnmist Party ample material 
with which to work. 
1. Edmond Taylor, "The Conmnmists• New Look in France." ~Reporter, 
March .30, 1954. 
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COOCLUSIW 
Although it seems unlikely that the French Communist Party will 
seize power in France at this time, it still remains a major force which 
thwarts the French gover.nment from taking strong and forceful steps in 
national and world affairs. In a sense the French Comnnmist Party bas a 
vested interest in the discontent and demoralizationwhich it propagates. 
Born out of France 1s inability to solve basic social, political, and 
economic problems, the Conmnmist Party, by its very presence, is a con-
stant reminder that there are areas of weakness and corrosion within 
French democracy. French post-war economic policies have provided plenty 
of weak spots for the Conmnmists to attack. Continued inflation, the 
failure in the early post-l-rar years to control the black market, the 
disproportionate burden of taxation carried b,r the urban worker, the 
unequal. distribution of wealth among the classes are some examples or 
the problems which have not been handled with satisfying results. French 
post-vrar economic policy has failed partly because the problems, them-
eel ves, were so overwhelming but also because French parliamentary 
gover.nment bas not been able to muster enough strength and unity to 
tackle these problems in a constructive way. In the National Assembly 
there are potential majorities against almost every policy decision but 
no clear and solid majority for any coherent set of policy decisions. 
At a time when nex:i.bility and unity are needed in the National Assembly 
there has been evidence of widening rifts among political parties which 
besides preventing the machinery of government from working smoothly are 
leading French political life further into a blind alley. One result of 
the general confusion that the French political picture presents is a 
feeling of indifference and apathy toward the business of politics, which, 
because of its contradictions, lacks the support and understanding that 
it desperately needs. 
Conmunism through its ideology, its propaganda, and its militants 
has taken advantage of the discrepancies in French society in the turbulent 
post-war period and has acquired many sympathetic followers. The continued 
popularity of the French Communist Party is a manifestation of general 
dissatisfaction with the social and legal system of France which, ap-
parently, bas never been accepted wholeheartedly by a large segment of 
the French population. These people have felt discriminated against for 
a long time and consider the improvement of their status through consti-
tutional means a difficult feat to achieve. A sense of injustice has 
encouraged the revolutionary tradition in France which dates back to 1793 
and which has manifested itself in the revolts of the working class in 
1848 and 18'71. The long discrimination against the labor classes by the 
industrialists and their failure to improve the distribution of profits, 
the late arrival of social legislation and reforms all contributed to the 
revolutionary temper of the workers. 
Fulfilling the requirements of a revolutionary party in line 
with French historical experience is not sufficient reason in itself to 
explain the continued success of the Conmunist Party in France. The ex-
planation of Comrmmist strength is much more complex and diverse. The 
stronghold of the French Communist Party is still the urban proletariat 
who votes the Communist ticket in hope of obtaining a better standard of 
living. But the Communist appeal goes deeper than a protest of economic 
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and social conditions. Its best and most enthusiastic militants often 
come from the higher income brackets and other social categories whose 
living conditions are far from miserable. Some human beings are attracted 
to a party that prides itself on being more than a mere political. party, 
that offers its members a rational explanation on their world and gives 
them a dynamic quasi-religious faith. The Comonmist Party, writes Rossi,l 
is at the same time a movement, a community, and an 
order, and has become the supreme fact before which 
aJ.l realities liBlSt give way. No personal interest, 
no sentimental reason can constitute a valid alibi 
when they compete with duties deriving from party 
membership • • • One can enter another party and 
leave it at the first tum and not be otherwise 
affected by this simple episode in the course of a 
life; on the contrary, allegiance to the Comnrunist 
party constitutes a fundamental experience. One can-
not go through it without being deeply affected by it 
••• The party is for the Conmnmist his country, his 
order, his fatherland; 1 • esprit de party is the supreme 
value both ideally and practically, a value that nmst 
be developed unceasingly. 
The individual who wishes to make a total commitment in becoming a member 
of an 'elite' order finds his opportunity within the closed society of the 
Comnnmist Party. 
The aMl.ity of the French Conmnmist Party to satisfy deep seated 
psychological needs and to present to its members a unified program of 
action constitutes its fUndamental strength in France. Whether the Party 
will continue to respond to the needs of the French voter depends on 
several factors. One involves the ability of the French government to 
provide a more satisfying program of economic and social reforms which 
1. I. Rossi, Pttysiologie gg Parti Conmruniste Francais, Paris, 1948, p. 302. 
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will alleviate the particular hardships of different classes in France. 
Another depends on the recognition by the French voter of the inconsist-
encies and opportunism which is so well exemplified by the French Communist 
Party. The ignorance of the average French voter of the economic and 
social conditions outside his own constituency had prevented him from 
becoming aware of the unscrupulous tactics of Communist appeals. The 
strong insularity of French rural areas coupled with the attraction for 
a vague universal approach to political problems among segments of the 
French population has strengthened the position of the Party. Once, hOW'-
ever, the French voter becomes more articulate in his voting habits, it 
seems plausible to expect a further decline in the popularity of the Party. 
A third factor affecting the strength of the Party deals with 
the internal structure of the Party itself. The strains and convulsions 
which the Party has been experiencing in the past years has already had 
serious repercussions on its ability to operate effectively. HOW' the 
Party is able to cope with internal pressures has a direct bearing on its 
future status in France. 
A study of the Communist problem in France encounters many com-
plex psychological barriers. One becomes aware that no simple remedy for 
the gradual disappearance of the Communist threat can be effected. The 
existence of the French Communist Party in 1954 bears testimony that, 
despite the losses of its major assets which it possessed in 1946, it 
continues to thrive. 
Appendix 1. 
ELECTORAL STATISTICS 
REFERENDUM (Metropolitan France)* 
October 21, 1945 May 5, 1946 October 13, 1946 
Number l Number ! Number 1 
A£firmative •• l7,957,868 96.4 9,109,771 47.0 9,002,287 53.6 
Negative..... 670,672 3.6 10,272,586 53.0 7,790,856 46.4 
Total •••••••• l8,628,540 100 19,382,357 100 16,793,143 100 
Abstentions •• 4,968,578 20.2 4,767,717 19.3 7,775,893 31.2 
Source: A. Constituti0n for the Fourth Republic, Foundation for Foreign 
Affairs, 1947, p. 81. 


































* Ambassase De France, Service De Presse et D'Information, Document No. 51, 
July 16, 1951. 
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ABSTRACT 
The existence of a strong and ,.;ell organized Communist Party 
in France supported by five million voters on election day is one of the 
outstanding feature s of the French post-'t'rar period. A1 though Communist 
pow·er has been on the \"l'ane in France since the expulsion of' the Communist 
Party f'rom the Ramadier cabinet in May 1947, it managed to retain its vot-
ing strength in the 1951 major election. Neither the political isolation 
of' the Communist Party since 1947 and its obvious identification ,.ritg· the 
policies of' the Soviet Union has deterred the French citizen f'rom casting 
his vote in favor of Communist candidates. Moreover, a study of the geo-
graphical distribution of electoral votes for Communist sponsored candidates 
reveals that Communist voters are vridely distributed throughout the French 
nation. 
1m explanation of' ,.,.hy five million ~renchmen continue to vote 
the Communist ticket on election day encounters a variety of different 
motives and reasons indicating that the composition of the French elector-
ate is very heterogeneous. The number of Communist voters far exceeds 
the number of militant Communists ,.rho support the Communist Party out of 
personal belief in Communist philosophy. Not only are four-fifths of Com-
munist voters not Party members but they vote the Communist ticket for 
reasons which often have little to do with the special nature and aims of 
the French Oommtmist Party. 
The reasons for the attraction of a totalitarian party in post-
vrar France 't'rhose principles are alien to French national interests can 
partly be understood in the context of the difficult post-war period. 
2 
The disillusionment l'Thich followed World vlar II coupled •·Ti th the severe 
economic hardships imposed on the French people are major factors leading 
to the attraction for the French Communist Party. The Communist Party was 
regarded by t he French people in the imnediate post-war pe riod as an accept-
able and legal contender for political power. Its record of heroism during 
the Resistance and its vociferous espousal of French democratic ideals led 
many to believe that it had discarded its revolutionary attitude permanently. 
However, the attitude of the French Communist Party in the two con-
stituent assemblies and the consequent behavior of Party leaders in the French 
cabinet during the early days of the Fourth Republic indicated to other poli-
tical parties that the Communist Party could not be trusted. Two issues 
forced the Communist Party to define its equivocal position. These were 
the war in Indo-China and the wage stabilization policies of the government. 
The fear of losing >vorking class support and of being labeled pro-American 
vrhen acceptance of American aid under the JViarshall Plan \·ias being considered 
helped to resolve the conflicting attitudes of the Party. In J-llay 1947 the 
Party vras expelled from the Ramadier cabinet for its support of the Renault 
strikers. 
After May 1947 the French Communist Party became a party in 
opposition. Its ability to retain strength in France depended on the re-
actions of different social classes in France. Further analysis of the 
Communist elect orate reveals that various social groups vie;.red the French 
Communist Party as an outlet for their O\'m personal grievances and frustra-
tions rather than out of attraction for Comm~mist philosophy. The princi-
pal classes under consideration are the ;.!Orkers, farmers, and intellectuals. 
j 
3 
The acceptance of the Communist Party among the \'Torldng 
class was principally due to diff icult economic and social conditions 
in the post-war period. Continued inflation, failure in the early post-
vmr years to control the black market, the heavy load of taxes, and inade-
quate housing contri buted to rising discontent and dissatisfaction among 
the working classes. At the same time the worker vias struggling to main-
tain himself, he sav1 the re-entrenchment of the French middle class. The 
accumulated feelings of bitterness and resentment were easily manipulated 
by the Communists when the Party left the gover1Lment in 1947. The strong-
est factor favoring the success of the Party lay in its systematic and 
persistent defense of the ,.rorker, the "under-privileged" class in France, 
against those who are exploiting him. Furthermore, the very special sent·-
ment surrounding the chief leader of the Communist Party, Maurice Thorez, l 
made the v1orker feel that Maurice ''~as person:a.lly concerned about his futle. 
However in the series of 6ommunist-sponsored strikes that too 
place in 1947 and thereafter, \·;orkers became avJare that Communist leaders 
were willing to espouse their cause for the Party 1 s 01·1!1 purposes. This 
recognition is the primary reason 1vhy workers have been apathetic in re-
cent years to Communist appeals to participate in furthe r strikes. 
In addition to the economic and social hardships shared by th 
working class other factors played into Communist hands. They s ymbols o 
French synicalism have been manipulated by the Communists to v1in support 
among the l·rorkers. Most important among these symbols is the necessity 
for a violent upheaval to effect change, if change is to ta.lce place. 
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These are the main factors which have determined the choice of the 
workers on election day. An explanation for the QOntinued popularity of the 
Party is chiefly due to the lack of sufficient alternatives among French pol-
itical parties and the failure of them to understand the needs of the working 
clasa. 
The reasons that French farmers have given their support to Communist 
candidates in different rural areas of France is quite different from those of 
the worker. Their attraction for the Communist Party grew out of the old Ja-
cobin tradition which for decades has led many peasants particularly in the 
so th to vote for the party of the extreme Left. However, the Jacobin tra-
dition is not the only factor which has given birth to the flourishing of 
communism in rural France. The second significant fact is the widespread 
p~erty among certain segments of France's rural population. The heaviest 
concentration of what may be regarded as precapitalist farming is found in 
southern France which is the focus of greatest Communist strength in rural 
France. r These rual peasants live under anarchromistic economic and social 
conditions which make them susceptible to emotionally loaded appeals of their 
deeply felt, but not clearly analyzed resentment. 
The intellectuals of France, although outweighed nlunerically by the 
farmer and worker and in the attention given to them by the Party, provide 
an intellectual aura to the Party's philosophy and program. Their attraction 
for communi sm is largely a result of a desire to find effective outlets for 
the disillusionQent, despair, and appathy which followed World War II. The 
Party gave the intellectual faith, purpose and a sense of community. But, 
becoming a member of the French Communist Party was not usually satisfying 
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to those intellectuals as they could not resolve the many contradictions 
that Party membership imposed on them. It is for these reasons that many 
intellectuals became disenchanted with the Communist Party. 
Another factor which has helped the Communist Party to gain the 
support of the French people lies in its tightly knit and well organized 
party structure. The highly centralized and well disciplined corps of men 
and womentrained to act swiftly and effectively on immediate notice enables 
the Communist Party to operate wi th maximum efficiency. The secret conduct 
of activities and the compulsory obligation of the subordinate to carry out 
directives given to him wi t hout question also has its disadvantages. Because 
of the tremendous power the top officials of the French Communist Party wield, 
a continuous rivalry for the key positions goes on. TI1is rivalry arises part-
ly out of clashing personal aspirations and partly out of the manipulation of 
these ambitions by Moscow authorities. The castigation of Marty and Tillon 
revealed Hoscow 1 s fear of one or the other becoming too independent. The 
loss of these t1-10 pqm.lar figures is one reason for the drop in membership 
of the Party. Young people have been reluctant to join a party which casts 
out popular resistance heroes. The drop in membership is undoubtedly also 
due tothe Party's unswerving subservience to the demands of the Soviet Union 
and the subsequent isolation of the Party from other French political parties. 
The disadvantages of a party organized on a totalitarian basis may outweigh 
the advantages although predictions for future successes of the Party are 
difficult to make at this time. 
The attitude of the French Communist Party twoard France's foreign 
policy indicates its allegiance to the Soviet Union. Since 1947 the French 
Communist Party has usually supported Soviet policies and opposed the major 
policies of the French govern~ent. Among the various themes in Communist 
pr opaganda, the appeal to anti-German sentiment is by far the strongest in 
the post->·Jar period. Fear of a revived Germany is coupled with American 
imperialism which, through manipulating Germany in its own fashion, is 
striving for 1vorld conquest. Recognition of the strong anti-German 
feeling among the French population has given the French Communists a 
powerful weapon with which to influence public opinion. The ability 
of the French Communist Party to support any group in spite of its poli-
tical affiliation whi ch is opposed to Germany's entrance into the Euro-
pean Defense Communit;; lends validity to the Party 1 s ov-m opposi.ion. 
These are the major factors which contribute to Communist 
strength in France today. A study of the Communist problem in France 
encounters many complex psychological barriers. One be'comes aware that 
no simple remedy for the gradual disappearance of the Communist threat 
can be effected.. The existence of the French Communist Party in 1~54 
bears testimony that, despite the losses of its major assets which it 
possessed in 1946, it continues to thrive. 
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